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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, the most advanced form of grid-deployed energy storage2
involved pumping water up a hill. 3 But “newer storage technologies like
1

J.D., 2013, Columbia Law School. Please feel free to send comments, corrections, or related
suggestions to ahm2138@columbia.edu.
2
For the purposes of this Article, “grid-deployed energy storage” (“energy storage”, or just
“storage”) refers to the storage of different forms of energy that may be beneficial to the bulk
power system. For example, while pumped hydroelectric storage refers to the potential energy
stored in a reservoir of water, it is the conversion of that energy to electricity by a water turbine
generator that makes it useful. Similarly, a flywheel stores kinetic energy to spin a generator, and
batteries convert chemical energy directly into electricity. While there are useful applications for
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flywheels and chemical batteries have recently achieved technological maturity
and are well into successful pilot stages and, in some cases, commercial
operation”. 4 If widely adopted these new energy storage technologies will
fundamentally alter the operation of our electricity system.
Energy storage carries electricity through time, just as transmission lines
carry it through space—without it, electrical energy must be used at the instant it
is generated.5 Storage resources transform electrical energy into another form of
energy that can be stored and then used to regenerate electricity when needed.6
Because the United States grid has extremely limited energy storage capacity, grid
operators must match the supply of thousands of generators with the load7 of
millions of end users in an unceasing, moment-to-moment dance of staggering
complexity. And the dance is only becoming more complicated as renewable
resources like solar and wind—which have variable and unpredictable outputs—
constitute an increasing portion of our generation mix.8
stored energy (for example, thermal energy) that do not convert energy into electricity, but can
substitute for electrical power by providing an end use, these types of energy storage are not the
subject of this paper. Their function is limited to particular end uses beyond the jurisdiction of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).
3
Pumped storage hydroelectric is the oldest form of energy storage. The earliest known use
of pumped storage technology was in Switzerland in 1882. For nearly a decade, a pump and
turbine operated with a small reservoir as a hydro-mechanical storage system. Beginning in the
early 1900s, several small pumped storage plants were constructed in Europe, mostly in Germany.
The first unit in North America was the Rocky River Pumped Storage plant, constructed in 1929
on the Housatonic River in Connecticut. See PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED
STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, at 24, available at http://www.hydro.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b1.pdf.
4
FERC, Request for Comments Regarding Rates, Accounting and Financial Reporting for
New Electric Storage Technologies, Docket No. AD10-13-000, 75 FR 36381 (June 11, 2010).
5
See, e.g., ELECTRICITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, 2012 STORAGE REPORT: PROGRESS AND
PROSPECTS, at 1 (October 2012) (hereinafter “EAC 2012”), available at
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/EAC%20Paper%20-%202012%20Storage%20Report%20%2015%20Nov%202012.pdf.
6
See, e.g., Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 95 FERC ¶ 61476 (June 29, 2001) (“Norton will
use electrically-driven air compressors to produce compressed air, and in this sense, will convert
one form of energy that is not storable (electric energy) to another form of energy that is storable
(compressed air). This process (which, for convenience's sake, we term the ‘conversion/storage
cycle’) allows Norton to ‘store’ energy (as compressed air in the underground cavern) for
extended periods of time (hence the term, ‘energy storage facility’). When demand for and the
price of electric energy increase (that is, during peak hours), Norton will release the compressed
air through gas-fired turbine generators, and in this manner, the energy in the compressed air will
be converted back to electric energy”.).
7
“Load” refers to an end-use device or customer that receives power from the electric system.
It may also refer to the aggregate of loads, and in that usage is interchangeable with “demand”.
8
See, e.g., AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY ON THE
GRID, at 8 (2010) (“[T]he variability of renewable resources . . . introduces uncertainty in
generation output on time scales of seconds, hours and days. These uncertainties, affecting up to
70% of daytime solar capacity due to passing clouds, and 100% of wind capacity on calm days,
are much greater than the relatively predictable uncertainties of a few per cent in demand that
system operators now deal with regularly. Variability becomes increasingly difficult to manage as
penetration levels increase.”).
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The prospect of energy storage is nothing new, 9 but a confluence of
factors has occasioned an energy storage renaissance. Most importantly, certain
advanced storage technologies have recently become cost-effective. 10 At the
same time, energy storage can address some of the major energy challenges of our
time by enhancing the reliability, resiliency, and efficiency of our electricity
system, while reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. 11 Among other
benefits, energy storage resources can reduce our dependence on inefficient
peaking plants, increase the capacity factor 12 of existing generation and
transmission infrastructure, and facilitate the integration of renewable resources—
all with zero direct emissions.13
Driving the storage renaissance is a dramatic surge in federal and state
support. Through the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”),
in a section called the United States Energy Storage Competitiveness Act,
Congress allocated $295 million to the Department of Energy (“DOE”) each
fiscal year through 2018 (about $2.7 billion total) to support the research,
development, and demonstration of advanced storage technologies. 14 Most
recently, in early 2013, the Secretary of Energy announced a new Joint Center for
Energy Storage Research, with $120 million to fund nanotechnological research

9

See supra, note __, discussing the origins of pumped storage.
See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ELECTRICITY ENERGY STORAGE TECHNOLOGY
OPTIONS A WHITE PAPER PRIMER ON APPLICATIONS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS (hereinafter “EPRI,
TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS”), at 5-1 (2010), available at
http://www.electricitystorage.org/images/uploads/static_content/technology/resources/ESA_TR_5
_11_EPRIStorageReport_Rastler.pdf. Indeed, projected growth in the advanced storage sector is
remarkable. A recent study predicts that global grid-deployed energy storage will have an average
year-on-year demand growth of 231% from 2012 through 2015, becoming a $113.5 billion market
by 2017, accounting for nearly 52 GW of new capacity. See Lux Research, Press Release,
Forecasting Global Demand for Grid Storage: 2012 through 2017, at
http://www.luxresearchinc.com/blog/2012/06/forecasting-global-demand-for-grid-storage-2012through-2017/.
11
In recent years, a variety of high-profile studies were published emphasizing the benefits
and applications of various advanced energy storage resources. See generally EAC 2012, supra
note __; JIM EYER & GARTH COREY, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, ENERGY STORAGE FOR
THE ELECTRICITY GRID: BENEFITS AND MARKET POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE (February 2010)
(hereinafter “SANDIA 2010”), available at
http://sgstage.nrel.gov/sites/default/files/resources/energy_storage.pdf.
12
“Capacity factor” is the ratio of actual generation (i.e. usage) to the maximum potential
output (i.e. nameplate capacity), expressed as a percent. See FERC, Guide to Market Oversight,
Glossary, at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp.
13
The only storage resource with direct emissions is traditional compressed air energy
storage. See infra, section I.C.
14
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17231(p). The program is intended to promote “energy storage systems
for electric drive vehicles, stationary applications, and electricity transmission and distribution”.
Id. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17231. Congress also instructed the Secretary of Energy to establish an Energy
Storage Advisory Council (“EAC”) within the Department of Energy (“DOE”), consisting of
representatives of the energy storage industry. According to a recent GAO study, between fiscal
years 2009 and 2012, the federal government allocated a total of $1.3 billion to research and
development in advanced energy storage technologies. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, BATTERIES AND ENERGY STORAGE (August 2012), available at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647742.pdf.
10
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into advanced battery systems.15 The DOE has also used $185 million from the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) to provide
matching funds for sixteen energy storage pilot projects, with a total value of
$772 million and total capacity of 537MW. 16 ARRA also established an
Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit to support domestic manufacturing
of energy storage devices and other advanced energy technologies through a 30%
investment tax credit.17
State interest in storage is strongest among states with aggressive
Renewable Portfolio Standards and attendant grid reliability concerns. In 2010,
through the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, New
York established the New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology (“NYBEST”). 18 NY-BEST supports the in-state development and deployment of
storage through funding, advocacy, and information sharing among its consortium
of members.19 Meanwhile, in 2010, the California legislature enacted AB 2514,
which instructed the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) to adopt
an energy storage procurement target for state-regulated public utilities by
October 2013.20 Even before finalizing its AB 2514 rules, the CPUC has made
history by becoming the first state regulator to set an energy storage procurement
target, mandating that Southern California Edison procure at least 50MW of
energy storage as part of its long-term local capacity requirements for the Los
Angeles Basin.21
But federal regulations threaten to undermine the successful deployment
of storage on the grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or
“the Commission”) regulates the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate
transmission and interstate wholesale energy transactions.22 While states regulate
local distribution facilities and retail sales, substantially all electricity ultimately
delivered to consumers in the United States passes through FERC’s jurisdiction.
Depending on the circumstance, a storage device might behave like any of the
traditional grid classifications: generation, transmission, distribution, and even
load. These multifaceted operational characteristics, which make storage so
15

See Joint Center for Energy Storage Research, DOE Energy Innovation Hub Batteries and
Energy Storage (March 2013), at
http://science.energy.gov/~/media/bes/pdf/hubs/JCESR_Fact_Sheet.pdf
16
See ELECTRICITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ENERGY STORAGE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES ELECTRICITY GRID, at 3 (May 2011), available at
http://www.doe.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/FINAL_DOE_ReportStorage_Activities_5-1-11.pdf.
17
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 48C. Notably, ARRA tax credits are not included in the GAO’s $1.3
billion figure. See supra, note __, at 1. In February 2013, the DOE made another $150 million in
tax credits available for storage and other advanced energy manufacturers under the ARRA
program. See DOE, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Energy Department, Treasury
Announce Availability of $150 Million in Tax Credits for Clean Energy Manufacturers (February
7, 2013), at http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/progress_alerts.cfm/pa_id=837.
18
See NY-BEST, About Us, at http://www.ny-best.org/About_NY-BEST.
19
See id.
20
See Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2836(a).
21
See D. 13-02-015, adopted February 23, 2013.
22
See infra, section II.A.1.
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useful, also confound regulatory rules and categories tailored to the more rigid
operational characteristics of legacy technologies. Consequently, storage cannot
compete on a level playing field with traditional resources in FERC-jurisdictional
markets.
This federal regulatory lag impedes the commercialization of
technologies that the federal government itself supports with billions of dollars in
funding, while obstructing the success of state policies promoting storage and
renewable energy resources.23
Laudably, FERC has proactively addressed some particular barriers to
storage, which this Article will discuss, but many significant barriers remain.24
Part I introduces energy storage, particularly its history, its operational uses, and
its benefits. Part II introduces federal electricity regulation, and analyzes various
FERC-jurisdictional opportunities and barriers to energy storage. It also
highlights recent FERC actions that proactively address or incidentally impact
energy storage resources. Finally, Part III proposes actions FERC should take to
remedy identified barriers. In particular, it argues that FERC is required under the
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to eliminate unjust, unreasonable, and unduly
discriminatory barriers to energy storage in organized wholesale markets and
resource adequacy planning processes. It then argues that the Commission should
clarify its policies for classifying storage devices, without arbitrarily limiting
storage resources from maximally benefiting the grid by performing multiple
functions. Finally, it argues that energy storage resources should be considered
comparably alongside traditional resources in transmission planning processes.
I. ENERGY STORAGE: TECHNOLOGIES, USES, AND BENEFITS
All storage resources do one thing in common: they store energy. But the
catch-all term “energy storage” belies a diversity of technologies and applications.
This section briefly introduces the electricity system. Then it establishes a
framework for conceptualizing energy storage systems, and introduces the most
23

A123 Systems, Inc., a developer and manufacturer of advanced lithium ion batteries, was
awarded a federal grant of as much as $249.1 million to establish battery manufacturing operations
in Michigan, before it filed for bankruptcy in late 2012. See Bill Vlasic and Matthew L. Wald,
Maker of Batteries Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (October 16, 2012), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/battery-maker-a123-systems-files-forbankruptcy.html. In a conversation with the author, a representative of one major storage
company opined that A123’s bankruptcy was not a result of technological immaturity or costineffectiveness. Rather, A123’s debt commitments accrued faster than the company could
commercialize its technologies because existing regulations simply do not adequately
accommodate grid-deployed storage. After its reorganization, A123 remains a major player in the
advanced energy storage sector, under the name A123 Systems, LLC.
24
In recent years, FERC has become increasingly proactive in developing and formulating
policies and regulations to address new technologies and other emerging issues that affect FERCjurisdictional energy and transmission markets. This may be in large part attributable to the Office
of Energy Policy and Innovation (“OEPI”), announced in April 2009, and established in June
2010. See FERC, Delegations to Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, 75 FR 32657 (June 9,
2010). The OEPI focuses on, among other things, demand response, distributed generation,
energy efficiency, smart grid standards, and storage. See FERC, Office of Energy Policy and
Innovation, at http://www.ferc.gov/about/offices/oepi.asp.
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mature energy storage technologies. Finally, it discusses the applications and
benefits of grid-deployed energy storage. Rather than prefer one technology to
another, this Article is technology-agnostic, focusing primarily on the various
benefits to the grid of different storage applications.
A. The Electricity System: A Quick Primer
To understand how energy storage works, and how it benefits the grid, it is
useful to first describe how our electricity system works. Electricity infrastructure
is divided into three basic categories: generation, transmission, and distribution.25
The “bulk power system” includes long-distance transmission infrastructure and
energy from large, centralized generators.26 Generation resources are usually
location-constrained: wind is strongest in particular areas, for example, and dirty
coal plants should not be sited in densely populated urban centers. Thus, a
transmission grid is critical in that it moves power over long distances from sites
of generation to areas of demand. The United States is divided into three such
grids, or “synchronous interconnections”, known as the Western Interconnect,
Eastern Interconnect, and the Texas Interconnect.27 The transmission grid ends
where a high-voltage transmission line meets a step-down transformer connecting
to the distribution grid, consisting of local, lower voltage lines that deliver
electricity to end users.28
Without energy storage, grid operators must ensure that the instantaneous
supply of electricity meets constantly changing end-user demand. The varying
need for heating, industrial uses, cooling, lighting, and other end uses drives daily
and seasonal patterns. To satisfy demand, the United States bulk electricity
system relies on a diversity of generation sources. In 2012, the United States’ net
generation share by primary energy source was as follows: coal, 37%; natural
gas, 30%; nuclear, 19%; hydroelectric, 7%; other renewables (wind, solar,
biomass, etc.), 5%; and other sources, 2%.29 “Baseload” generators satisfy the
significant, constant demand for electricity. Common baseload generators include
coal, nuclear, and, increasingly, combined-cycle gas turbine (“CCGT”) plants.30
25

For a more complete primer on the electricity system and its regulation, see generally
REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE
(March 2011) (hereinafter “RAP Guide”), available at
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/645.
26
See 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2011) (The Energy Policy Act of 2005 defines the “bulk power
system” as “facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric
energy transmission network (or any portion thereof); and . . . electric energy from generation
facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability. The term does not include facilities
used in the local distribution of electric energy.”).
27
See RAP Guide, supra note __, at 15.
28
See id. at 65.
29
EIA, Electric Power Monthly, Data for December 2012 (released Feb 23, 2013), available
at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/epm_table_grapher.cfm?t=epmt_1_1.
30
CCGT plants are the most efficient natural gas-fueled power plants, with efficiencies of up
to 60%. Traditional gas turbines have efficiencies only as high as 42%. See INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PROGRAMME, GAS-FIRED POWER,
at 1 (April 2010), available at www.iea-etsap.org/web/E-TechDS/PDF/E02-gas_fired_power-GSAD-gct.pdf. With natural gas prices at historic lows (driven by the shale boom) and increasing
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Most baseload plants have high capital costs but low variable costs, and are thus
incentivized to run continuously and at a high capacity factor.31 Additionally,
technical constraints (especially for nuclear plants) restrict rapid changes in
output.32 To meet predictable daily demand fluctuations, grid operators usually
call
on
hydroelectric
and
natural
gas
plants
to
serve
as
“intermediate” or “load following” units, which increase and decrease output to
match daily load fluctuations.33 Finally, grid operators call on peaking plants,
usually old, inefficient gas- or oil-fired turbines, to meet the very highest periods
of demand.34 Peaking plants are capable of rapid ramping,35 and are thus able to
respond quickly and accurately, within minutes or even seconds, to a request for
increased or decreased energy output. Because load-following units are less
efficient than baseload units, and peaking plants are yet worse,36 the marginal cost
of power—to generators, utilities, and ultimately, consumers37—increases during
peak hours, sometimes spectacularly during the highest peak days.38
In addition to meeting the predictable daily and seasonal variations in
demand, grid operators must keep additional reserves available to meet
unforeseen, unpredictable, and/or rapid fluctuations in the balance of demand and
supply. These reserve resources provide “ancillary services”, which FERC
defines as “[t]hose services that are necessary to support the transmission of
capacity and energy from resources to loads”.39 To provide ancillary services,
regulatory costs for coal generation, CCGT plants have become cost competitive with coal plants
as a baseload resource, leading to so-called “coal-to-gas switching”. See, e.g., Ken Silverstein,
Coal to Gas moves Are Generating Economic Waves, FORBES (March 13, 2013), available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/03/13/coal-to-gas-moves-are-generatingeconomic-waves/.
31
See RAP Guide, supra note __, at 106.
32
See, e.g., World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power Reactors (December 2012), at
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Power-Reactors/Nuclear-Power-Reactors/.
33
For a typical daily load profile, see, e.g., CAISO, Today’s Outlook (last checked April 9,
2013), at http://www.caiso.com/outlook/SystemStatus.html (showing real-time system demand,
day-ahead demand forecast, hour-ahead demand forecast, and available resources in CAISO).
34
See EIA, Glossary, at http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=P#peak_load_plant.
35
Ramp is the rate, expressed in megawatts per minute, that a generator can change its output.
See NERC, Glossary of Terms, available at http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.
36
See, e.g., EIA, Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost
of operation (August 17, 2012), at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590
(showing typical supply curve, or “generation stack”, and the increasing marginal cost (or variable
operating cost) of generation).
37
The cost of electricity to consumers—the retail rate—has traditionally been set at a fixed
price, regardless of the time of day or year. Some states are experimenting with incentive retail
rates, or time-of-use rates, that vary depending on system demand, to send price signals to end
users that accurately communicate the real-time marginal cost of wholesale power. Regardless,
even consumers in fixed-rate regions ultimately pay for the high marginal cost of peak power
because the fixed rate accounts for the full cost of power, if not in real-time. See RAP Guide,
supra note __, at 55.
38
See, e.g., EIA, Texas Heat Wave, August 2011: Nature and Effects of an Electricity Supply
Shortage (September 9, 2011), at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3010
(discussing “super peak” prices in ERCOT during a heatwave in August, 2011, when real-time
energy prices reached the market-cap $3,000/MWh).
39
FERC Guide to Market Oversight, Glossary, at http://www.ferc.gov/marketoversight/guide/glossary.asp.
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meet predictable peak loads, and ensure adequate resources in case of a system
contingency (such as an unplanned generator or transmission line outage) or a
demand forecast error, bulk power systems generally maintain installed reserve
capacity exceeding the annual projected peak load by a margin of around fifteen
percent or more.40
B. The Origin of Energy Storage: or, Pumping Water up a Hill
The current surge of interest in energy storage centers on advanced storage
systems, including batteries, flywheels, and other technologies, which are
discussed below. But energy storage has been used for nearly a century in the
form of pumped-storage hydroelectric power stations (“PSH”), i.e. pumping water
up a hill, and later letting it fall back down. It seems so simple as to be a joke, but
PSH is by far the most common form of energy storage currently in use.41 In the
United States, there are forty PSH projects accounting for 22 GW, or about 2.2
percent of net summer capacity in the United States.42 PSH facilities consist of a
lower and upper reservoir. Pumps move water to the upper reservoir when the
system acts as a load, taking excess electricity from the bulk power system during
off-peak hours and storing it as gravitational potential energy. When the grid
requires additional energy, such as load following service, the system lets water
fall to the lower reservoir, creating kinetic energy that turns turbines and
generates electricity.43 PSH facilities may be closed-loop,44 or open to a natural
waterway like normal hydroelectric dams. Round-trip efficiencies are around
eighty-five percent, and in the United States, the capacities of PSH systems range
from a few MW to 3000MW.45

40

See, e.g., NERC, Reliability Indicators: Planning Reserve Margins, at
http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=4|331|373.
41
About ninety-nine percent of energy storage resources deployed globally are PSH. See
EAC 2012, supra note __, at 2.
42
See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 258 (September 2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf. Net summer capacity is “[t]he maximum
output, commonly expressed in megawatts (MW), that generating equipment can supply to system
load, as demonstrated by a multi-hour test, at the time of summer peak demand (period of June 1
through September 30.) This output reflects a reduction in capacity due to electricity use for
station service or auxiliaries.” EIA, Glossary, at
http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=net%20summer%20capacity.
43
The pump and the turbine is actually one mechanism, which either moves or is moved by
water, depending whether energy is being stored or discharged. See NATIONAL HYDROPOWER
ASSOCIATION, PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, at 30 (July 2012), available at http://www.hydro.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b1.pdf.
44
All operational PSH in the United States are open-loop systems. See id. But in a trend
worth noting, an increasing share of proposed PSH projects are closed-loop. Closed-loop systems
are considered less environmentally destructive than open systems, because they do not affect
rivers and related resources, and can utilize abandoned mines that are already heavily impacted by
human activity. These differences may make closed-loop systems easier to site and permit. See
FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/geninfo/licensing/pump-storage.asp.
45
See EIA, Form 860 Data (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.
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The history of PSH illustrates the value of energy storage as an enabling
and enhancing technology for other grid resources. Output from nuclear plants
cannot easily be varied.46 Meanwhile, because of the enormous upfront capital
cost of construction, and low variable and marginal costs of operation, nuclear
plants are incentivized to run constantly and at high capacity factors.47 But in the
early days of nuclear power, a vexing operational puzzle was how to maximize
plant output where doing so would generate electricity in excess of off-peak
system demand.48 Unlike peak loads, where demand exceeds baseload supply, the
problem of nuclear was the opposite: when optimally utilized, a nuclear
generator’s invariable baseload output might exceed the lowest trough in daily
demand. Other baseload plants, like CCGT and to some extent coal, do not
confront this issue because their output is more easily varied.
The solution reached was to construct PSH plants in connection with new
nuclear generators.49 While conventional load-following or peaking plants can
only add energy to the grid, storage resources like PSH can both add energy to the
grid, and absorb energy from the grid for later use. Accordingly, the primary
development of pumped storage power in the United States and worldwide
occurred in the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s in parallel with the
construction of a large number of nuclear power stations.50 Between 1970 and
1985, seventy percent of currently installed PSH capacity in the United States was
constructed, with only thirteen percent constructed since.51 The below graph
illustrates the historical relationship between nuclear and PSH.

46

See, e.g., World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power Reactors (December 2012), at
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Power-Reactors/Nuclear-Power-Reactors/.
47
See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POWER PLANTS: CHARACTERISTICS AND COSTS,
at 11 (November 2008), available at https://opencrs.com/document/RL34746/.
48
The reliable operation of the bulk electricity system requires supply to meet demand. An
excess of energy, no less than an undersupply of energy, affects system stability.
49
See NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL,
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, at 30 (July 2012),
available at http://www.hydro.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b1.pdf.
50
Id.
51
See EIA, Form 860 Data (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia860/.
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Worldwide Installed Nuclear and PSH, Development History

52

Traditional PSH was designed as a time-shifting storage resource, to save
excess generation during off-peak hours for use during daytime peak loads.
Accordingly, all of the installed PSH in the United States have simple, singlespeed pumps and turbines, only designed to save or generate electricity at a fixed
rate. 53 This limitation distinguishes PSH from other more nimble storage
technologies, discussed below, which are capable of varying input and output to
respond more rapidly and precisely to system needs, and thereby provide a variety
of different services. Although adjustable-speed PSH systems have been
developed elsewhere, notably Japan, none are currently deployed in the United
States.54
FERC statistics may indicate a revived interest in PSH. Under section 10
of the FPA, FERC has licensing authority over hydroelectric power projects,
including PSH.55 Under section 10, an applicant may apply for a “preliminary
permit”, which has “the sole purpose of maintaining priority of application for a
license” for a duration not to exceed three years.56 As of March 2013, FERC has
52

Adapted from NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT
COUNCIL, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, at 25
(July 2012), available at http://www.hydro.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b1.pdf.
53
See id. at 30.
54
See id. This may change soon, however: in September, 2011, the Department of Energy,
jointly with the Department of the Interior, awarded $6.8 million to an advanced PSH facility
designed to “dynamically respond to the electrical grid”. DOE, Press Release, Departments of
Energy and Interior Award Nearly $17 Million for Advanced Hydropower Technologies, at
http://energy.gov/articles/departments-energy-and-interior-award-nearly-17-million-advancedhydropower-technologies.
55
See 16 U.S.C. § 797.
56
See id. § 798.
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issued over forty active preliminary permits for PSH, with a total proposed
capacity of 49,673MW.57 In 2005, there were zero applications for a preliminary
permit, while in 2008, 2010, and 2011, there were over thirty per year.58 Interest
may be driven by the rapid growth in wind capacity, which has grown by an order
of magnitude in the last decade nationally, from 3,900MW of net summer
capacity in 2001 to 45,200MW in 2011.59 Wind has the inconvenient tendency to
blow stronger at night, when demand is lowest—an operational difficulty
strikingly similar to the stiff off-peak output of nuclear plants.60 Unlike nuclear
generators, wind turbine output can be reduced by adjusting blade pitch (also
called “feathering”), but foregone generation is wasteful and particularly
unfortunate for a resource with almost zero variable operating costs.61 Perhaps
unsurprisingly, over twenty percent of preliminary permits for new PSH are for
projects in California,62 where CAISO estimates that wind capacity will soon
exceed off-peak demand by 3,000 to 5,000MW.63
PSH is an efficient energy storage technology for shifting bulk energy
generation and consumption, and adjustable-speed PSH may be capable of
providing other services. But PSH has a variety of limitations. Most
significantly, PSH require highly specific land formations to accommodate a
lower and upper reservoir. Moreover, like any hydroelectric facility, PSH have
significant land use footprints and attendant environmental impacts.64 Even if an
appropriate site were secured, in considering a license application for a new PSH
57

See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, Map of Issued Preliminary Permits (March 25, 2013),
at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage/issuedpermits.pdf.
58
See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, Map of Preliminary Permit Application Trends
(January 1, 2013), at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pumpstorage/trends-pump-storage.pdf.
59
EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 258 (September 2012), available at
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.
60
See, e.g., EPRI, TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS, supra note __, at A-18 to 19.
61
See, e.g., EIA, Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost
of operation (August 17, 2012), at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590
(showing wind and other renewables at the low-cost end of the supply curve).
62
See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, Map of Issued Preliminary Permits, at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage/issued-permits.pdf
(10,203MW of the 49,673MW of issued preliminary permit capacity for new PSH are located in
California.).
63
CPUC, POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION, ELECTRIC ENERGY STORAGE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES, at 11 (2010), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/71859AF5-2D26-4262-BF5262DE85C0E942/0/CPUCStorageWhitePaper7910.pdf. California installed wind capacity has
grown three-fold in the last decade. See DOE, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Wind
Powering America, Installed Wind Capacity, at
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp.
64
For example, FERC has issued a final environmental impact statement pursuant to NEPA
for one of two newly proposed and licensed PSH plants. The project, a closed-loop 1300MW
PSH plant located on the site of an inactive mine in Riverside County, CA, would require 2221.26
acres of land. See Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Eagle Mountain
Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Project (P-13123-002), January 30, 2012, available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2012/01-30-12.asp.
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system under the FPA, FERC must comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”) and complete a lengthy analysis of the proposed project’s
impacts on the human environment. 65 Other federal, state, and local laws
applicable to land- and water-intensive projects may also slow PSH development,
while offering a number of hooks for legal challenge.66 A final obstacle to PSH,
and one which may make other technologies more attractive up front, is that PSH
is the most capital intensive form of long-duration energy storage, with an
estimated capital cost of $1275/kW of capacity.67
Perhaps indicative of the difficulty of finding an appropriate location and
obtaining the necessary approvals, only two new PSH projects have come online
in the last decade,68 and only two PSH projects, with a total capacity of 42MW,
are planned for 2012-2016 according to the Energy Information Administration
(“EIA”).69 Pumped storage will be discussed further in other sections of this
Article, but current interest centers on advanced energy storage systems. New
storage resources are often better performing and less location-constrained than
PSH, while requiring fewer (if any) licenses or approvals (other than under
electricity law). Moreover, advanced systems have become more cost-effective in
recent years, and in some cases, have significantly lower capital costs. These
more nimble resources are the primary focus of this paper.
C. Conceptualizing Energy Storage: Power, Duration, Energy
This section provides a brief technical overview of energy storage, and the
criteria by which storage technologies are assessed and compared. Because this
Article is technology-agnostic, the following discussion focuses more on
operational characteristics than particular technologies.
Output from a conventional generator is only limited by the facility’s
power capacity (also called “nameplate capacity”) and the availability of primary
energy. In the case of thermal plants, like coal, natural gas, and nuclear, primary
energy is practically unlimited.
Thermal plants can generate electricity
unceasingly for indefinite periods of time (assuming a stable source of primary
fuel, and excepting occasional maintenance). Energy storage devices, on the
other hand, are limited energy resources because they cannot indefinitely
discharge energy and require recharging after a certain amount of use.
65

See, e.g., id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
For example, the Endangered Species Act may pose a significant barrier to open-loop PSH
systems, projects that could jeopardize listed aquatic and other wildlife. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et
seq. Meanwhile, many state-level environmental review statutes, such as the California
Environmental Quality Act, impose yet more stringent environmental review requirements than
NEPA, leading to more development cost and delay for large PSH projects. See Cal. Pub. Res.
Code § 21000. Land use and water laws may also apply.
67
See SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS COST UPDATE, A
STUDY FOR THE DOE ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS PROGRAM (April 2011), available at
http://prod.sandia.gov/techlib/access-control.cgi/2011/112730.pdf.
68
See EIA, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2011, Table 4.1 Count of Electric Power Industry
Power Plants, by Sector, by Predominant Energy Sources within Plant, 2002 through 2011 (2013),
available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf.
69
See id. at Table 4.5. Planned Generating Capacity Changes, by Energy Source, 2012-2016.
66

12

DRAFT—May 6, 2013
Energy storage devices can be analyzed along two axes, which together
constitute a third: (1) power capacity, (2) duration of discharge, and (3) energy
storage capacity.70 Power capacity is the maximum rate at which a resource can
generate energy, expressed in kW or MW, and is comparable to the nameplate
capacity of conventional generators. 71 But unlike conventional generators,
storage resources are time- and energy- limited. Duration of discharge is the
duration over which a storage device can discharge at its rated power capacity.
Finally, energy storage capacity is simply the total electrical energy a storage
device can generate in one full discharge cycle, expressed in kWh or MWh (and is
roughly found by multiplying power capacity by duration of discharge).72 Take
for example a battery with a power capacity rating of 1MW, and a discharge time
of 10 hours. In one full discharge cycle, the battery would produce 10MWh of
energy, and would then require recharging. 73 The below graph illustrates one
way of conceptualizing the power-duration-energy framework.

70

See id. at 2-4.
Notably, the nameplate capacity of a storage device is actually bi-directional. For example,
the nameplate capacity of a battery might be 10MW, and -10MW, because it can also absorb
energy. Thus, its net power capacity might be more accurately 20MW.
72
In battery terminology, the ratio of a battery’s power capacity to its energy storage capacity
is called the “c-rate”. Thus, a flywheel with a power capacity of 20MW and an energy storage
capacity of 5MWh would have a c-rate of 4C. On the other hand, a battery with a 20MW power
capacity and 100MWh of energy storage capacity would have a c-rate of C/5.
73
This calculation (power x duration) is not exactly right. The efficiency of a device may
vary with output. For example, a battery may have a power capacity of 10MW and discharge
duration at that power output of 1 hour, which would equal 10MWh. But at 5MW power output, it
might have a discharge duration of three hours, or 15MWh of energy. The difference is due to
efficiency, and varies between different ES. The point, however, is that these three variables
interact, and together define the operational limitations of any given energy storage resource.
71
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Rated power (MW) vs. Discharge time (hours)

74

In addition to the power-duration-energy criteria, energy storage devices
have other critical operational characteristics. Most importantly, storage
resources differ in how quickly they can respond to a request to adjust their
generation or consumption rate. Similarly, storage resources differ in how
quickly they can adjust output and how accurately they can track system requests.
Below are descriptions of the four most mature storage technologies,75 defined by
reference to power, duration, energy, response, ramp, and accuracy.76
PSH and compressed air energy storage (“CAES”): high-power, longduration, high-energy, quick-response, medium-ramp, medium-accuracy.
CAES, like PHS, harnesses mechanical energy to generate electricity. During offpeak hours, CAES systems pump air into a contained space, such as a
subterranean cavern or closed tank. During peak hours, air is released, reheated,
and passed through a turbine to generate electricity.77 By installed capacity,
CAES is third to PHS and batteries, with about 400MW worldwide as of August
2012.78 However, while PHS and CAES are generally faster and more accurate
than traditional generators, other storage resources are significantly more so.
74

CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, 2020 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF ENERGY STORAGE IN
CALIFORNIA, at 15 (November 2011) (hereinafter “CEC 2020”), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011publications/CEC-500-2011-047/CEC-500-2011-047.pdf This
graph is only approximate. Certain technologies extend beyond the operational limits expressed
herein.
75
For a comprehensive and more detailed discussion of the various storage technologies, see
generally EPRI, TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS, supra note __; CEC 2020, supra note __.
76
The graph above and the discussion below are only approximate. Particular instances of a
given technology may defy the more general characteristics of the technology.
77
Conventional CAES involves reheating compressed air by combusting natural gas, making
it the only storage resource with direct emissions. Conventional CAES is less efficient than PHS,
with round-trip efficiency of about 50%. See id. at 40-45.
78
See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 21.
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Moreover, traditional CAES and PHS are both severely location constrained,
requiring highly specific land features, e.g. a salt cavern or tiered reservoirs,
respectively.79
Flywheels:
low-to-medium-power, short-duration, low-energy,
instantaneous response, fast-ramp, high-accuracy. Flywheels store kinetic
energy during normal grid operation in heavy spinning cylinders. When a grid
operator sends a signal that requests the system to absorb power, the flywheel
uses power from the grid to drive the flywheel motor/generator, which in turn
spins up the flywheel. When a signal is sent for electrical power to be provided,
the momentum of the spinning flywheel drives the generator/motor and the
kinetic energy is converted into electrical energy for release to the grid. 80
Flywheels can discharge at their rated power capacity for about fifteen minutes.81
Importantly, flywheels can respond instantaneously and accurately to system
signals, rapidly adjusting and alternating between output and input.82
Batteries: low-to-medium-power, medium-to-long-duration, mediumto-high-energy, instantaneous-response, fast-ramp, high-accuracy. Batteries
have emerged as the most flexible energy storage option, offering a range of
power, duration, and energy capabilities. Moreover, unlike traditional PSH and
CAES, batteries can be deployed as distributed resources closer to or at the
“edge” of the grid, at the community level (also called Community Energy
Storage (“CES”)), at load sites, or even as transportable resources deployed
where- and as-needed.83 Driven in part by the technology developed in the
emerging hybrid, plug-in hybrid electric, and electric vehicle sectors (collectively,
“EVs”), battery technology has advanced significantly in recent years. Batteries
use electricity to create and store chemical energy, and now account for about half
of installed non-PSH energy storage globally, or 556MW, as of August 2012.84
Like flywheels, most batteries can ramp almost instantaneously and respond to
system demand with precision unparalleled in conventional resources.
D. Uses and Benefits
As limited energy resources, and unlike conventional generators, energy
storage resource applications must be time-limited. A variety of time-limited
79

New CAES technologies are in development that may increase the efficiency and flexibility
of CAES technology. See, e.g., LightSail Energy, at http://lightsailenergy.com/ (startup company
developing high-efficiency, modular, distributable CAES). Likewise, new PSH technologies may
make PSH less land-intensive and more nimble. See, e.g., CEC 2020, supra note __, at 38-40
(describing underground pumped storage technology).
80
Beacon Power is among the most prevalent companies in the flywheel sector. Their Smart
Energy 25 flywheel stores energy by spinning at rates up to 16,000 RPM (or 267 rotations per
second), levitated on hybrid magnetic bearings operating in a near-frictionless vacuum-sealed
environment. Beacon owns and operates the largest flywheel in the United States, in
Stephentown, NY. The 20MW flywheel facility consists of 200 high-speed 100 kW (25 kWh)
flywheels. See Beacon Power, Smart Energy 25 Flywheel, at
http://www.beaconpower.com/products/smart-energy-25.asp.
81
See id.
82
See id.
83
See CEC 2020, supra note __, at 167-78; SANDIA 2010, supra note __, at 128.
84
EAC 2012, supra note __, at 21.
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services are critical to addressing operational challenges arising from the need to
constantly and instantaneously match the supply and demand of electricity.
Storage resources can perform these functions more reliably and more efficiently
than traditional resources, while reducing emissions and the environmental
footprint of the bulk power system. The following sections discuss various uses
for storage on the grid, grouped under three basic benefit categories: reliability
and resiliency, efficiency, and environment and climate.
1. Reliability and Resiliency
Enhanced transmission-side system quality: Storage resources can
perform a variety of ancillary services critical to grid reliability and stability, in
many cases better than traditional resources.85 Perhaps most promising, storage
can be used to replace conventional reserves used for frequency control and other
grid support services that require fast response and rapid ramping.86 Natural gas
or hydroelectric generators, which currently perform ancillary services, can only
add power to the grid and require minutes to respond. A flywheel or battery can
respond instantly and ramp at rates significantly higher than traditional
generators, within an effective operating range twice its rated capacity.87 Through
faster and more accurate performance, storage resources provide up to four times
more frequency control per-MW of capacity than traditional generators. 88
Frequency control is widely considered the most cost-effective current application
of energy storage.89 And fast and accurate grid support resources capable of
ramping up and down will become critical to grid reliability with the growing
penetration of renewables and electric vehicles.90

85

Some ancillary services are discussed infra, at section II.B. Other transmission-side
ancillary functions include providing system inertia, ramping, and voltage support. See
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, MOVING ENERGY STORAGE FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY:
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON’S APPROACH TO EVALUATING ENERGY STORAGE CURRENTLY, at
6 (2011), available at
http://www.edison.com/files/WhitePaper_SCEsApproachtoEvaluatingEnergyStorage.pdf.
Currently, fast-ramping generation resources like natural gas and hydroelectric plants are used for
most ancillary services.
86
When the instantaneous supply and demand of electricity is equal, the grid’s high-voltage
alternating current pulses at a frequency of 60Hz. The best analogy is a balancing scale: when the
weights on each side (generation and load) are in balance, the scale is centered, and reads 60Hz.
Minor frequency deviations affect energy consuming devices; major deviations cause generation
and transmission equipment to separate from the grid, in the worst case leading to a cascading
blackout. See FERC, Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064, at P5 (October 20, 2011).
87
A 50MW storage device, for example, has an approximate -50 to +50MW operating range
that is equivalent to a zero to 100MW range for a combustion turbine for regulation purposes,
because it can switch between charging from and discharging to the grid.
88
See KEMA, INC., RESEARCH EVALUATION OF WIND AND SOLAR GENERATION, STORAGE
IMPACT, AND DEMAND RESPONSE ON THE CALIFORNIA GRID (prepared for the California Energy
Commission), at 6 (June 2010) (hereinafter “KEMA”), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2010publications/CEC-500-2010-010/CEC-500-2010-010.PDF.
89
See EAC 2012, supra note 4, at 38-39.
90
See KEMA, supra note __, at 3 (noting that with increasing penetration of renewables,
frequency regulation needs grow exponentially).
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Enhanced distribution-side system quality:
Similarly, on the
distribution side, batteries and flywheels would be effective for providing
ancillary services, including power quality and voltage control.91 Distributionside concerns have magnified in recent years with increased penetration of
distributed generation—especially rooftop solar photovoltaic (“PV”)—and EVs.92
With local and state governments promoting distributed generation and EVs
throughout the country, storage will likely play a key role—whether as CES or
distributed at load sites—in ensuring continuing distribution-side reliability.
Enhanced grid resiliency: Recent extreme weather events have
prompted greater concern for grid resiliency. Superstorm Sandy, for example, left
over eight million homes in the dark, some for over two weeks,93 and resulted in
billions of dollars of power outage-related economic losses and related costs.94
Storage resources located downstream from system failures could carry critical
load until system failures are resolved, including load-site storage resources used
for uninterruptible power supply.95 Likewise, transportable storage devices like
large batteries could be deployed to temporarily service affected areas. Storage
could also serve as a blackstart resource to restore operation to generation
facilities in the event of plant shut down and grid-wide outage, in lieu of diesel
generators and costly blackstart interconnections.96 And unlike the alternatives,
storage, including batteries and flywheels, respond instantaneously—indeed, so
quickly that end users would be unaware of any difference in supply even during
an emergency. Energy storage is also capable of improving the resiliency of the
grid in the event of more routine contingencies, including transmission congestion
or generation outages. For these applications, storage resources could replace
91

See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 15-16.
See id.
93
See EIA, Electricity restored to many in the Northeast but outages persist (November 9,
2012), at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=8730; CNN Wire Staff, Costs from
Sandy into the billions as thousands struggle, still, without power, CNN (November 13, 2012), at
http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/12/us/northeast-weather.
94
See ERIC S. BLAKE, ET AL., NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT
HURRICANE SANDY (AL182012), 22-29 OCTOBER 2012 (February 12, 2013), available at
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf.
95
See SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, MOVING ENERGY STORAGE FROM CONCEPT TO
REALITY: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON’S APPROACH TO EVALUATING ENERGY STORAGE
CURRENTLY, at 21-22 (2011), available at
http://www.edison.com/files/WhitePaper_SCEsApproachtoEvaluatingEnergyStorage.pdf. For
example, the erstwhile largest battery in the world, located outside Fairbanks, AK, is a nickelcadmium battery with a discharge duration of seven minutes at a peak power of 40MW, or fifteen
minutes at 26MW. The local electricity cooperative installed the battery to seamlessly power the
region’s residents in the event of an outage because (1) outages are relatively common, since the
entire region is dependent on a single intertie with Anchorage, and (2) the residents live in remote
areas and extreme weather conditions, making unreliable electricity particularly dangerous. See
Golden Valley Electrical Association, Battery Energy Storage System (BESS), at
http://www.gvea.com/energy/bess.
96
A blackstart is the process of restoring a power station to operation without relying on the
external electric power transmission network. Normally, a power station runs on its own energy.
In the event of a total plant shut down, it might draw energy from the grid. However, power
plants must be prepared to restart with self-supplied power, a so-called blackstart resource. See
NERC, Glossary of Terms, at http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.
92
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traditional generators that are kept online (spinning reserves) or offline but ready
(non-spinning reserves) to compensate for lost capacity in the event of a
contingency.97
2. Efficiency
Increased capacity factor of existing generation resources: Most
importantly, energy storage can increase the efficiency of the bulk power system
by increasing the capacity factor of existing generation resources.
As
demonstrated in the case of nuclear and PSH, high-energy storage resources like
batteries, compressed air, and PSH could permit greater reliance on efficient
baseload facilities, and simultaneously, less reliance on costly traditional reserves
and peaking facilities. 98 Storage could likewise ensure that no energy from
variable renewables goes unutilized by shifting off-peak energy to meet peak
demand.99 Together, these deployments of energy storage would reduce the cost
of meeting demand by reducing reliance on expensive generating reserves,
resources that are constructed but mostly kept idle.100 For example, the average
capacity factor of the two most common peaking plants, petroleum and (nonCCGT) natural gas turbines, was 7.8% and 10.1% respectively in 2009.101 In
short, storage enhances the efficiency of cost-effective baseload and renewable
generators, while reducing reliance on inefficient reserves and peaking facilities.
Increased utility of existing transmission resources:
On the
transmission side, storage would likewise improve the capacity of existing
transmission infrastructure. For example, storage could alleviate transmission
congestion and thereby defer the need for new transmission lines.102 Storage can
also be used along the transmission or distribution system to defer other kinds of
infrastructure upgrades. For example, storage is particularly valuable where
97

See infra, section II.B.
See supra, section I.B.
99
For example, wholesale electricity prices occasionally become negative on low-demand
nights with a high penetration of inflexible generators, like wind, nuclear, and sometimes
hydroelectric. See EIA, Negative prices in wholesale electricity markets indicate supply
inflexibilities, at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5110. Nuclear and
hydroelectric generators in some cases simply cannot curtail their output. Wind generators, on
the other hand, can curtail their output. But because they are currently eligible for a production
tax credit of approximately $22/MWh, it is rational for wind generators to sell power for up to
negative $22/MWh, i.e. to pay buyers up to $22/MWh. See id.
100
At the moment, these facilities, mainly oil and gas turbines, are the primary competition
for energy storage from a purely economic perspective. With natural gas prices at historic lows,
currently hovering around $3/Mbtu, the marginal cost of power from natural gas-fired operating
reserves is relatively low, and sets the benchmark with which storage must compete.
101
See U.S. Energy Information Administration/Electric Power Annual 2009, Table 5.2 (April
2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482009.pdf. Combined-cycle
gas turbines had a capacity factor of 42.2% in 2009, though that number has risen steadily with
low natural gas prices. See EIA, Average utilization of the nation's natural gas combined-cycle
power plant fleet is rising (June 9, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1730.
102
Congestion occurs when flows of electricity over a line reach the physical or electrical
capacity of the line or some related facility. In such instances, generators contributing to the
congestion must be curtailed, and, since those were the least-cost generators, other more expensive
generators must ramp up to ensure reliable grid operation. The result is higher electricity prices.
98
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transmission line upgrades would be extremely capital intensive relative to the
load to be served, as in remote areas.103
Cost savings to consumers: Without storage, electricity markets are
highly volatile, especially during peak events and system contingencies that limit
available supply.104 Even when markets are not supply constrained, the variable
operating cost of generation—and thus the cost to consumers—increases
dramatically during peak periods.105 By shifting cheap and efficient off-peak
energy to peak periods, storage will promote price stability and enhance system
efficiency by providing the same amount of power at a lower unit cost.106
3. Climate and Environment
Zero direct emissions alternative to traditional reserves: With the
exception of traditional CAES, energy storage resources have zero direct
emissions, in stark contrast to the GHG-intensive reserves and peaking resources
they would replace.107 Storage could be used to replace peaking resources on the
supply side or shave peak demand through distributed deployment. Storage could
also replace traditional reserves for providing ancillary services, many of which
are held running in idle around the clock, wasting energy and emitting GHGs.108
Additionally, the physical environmental footprint of storage resources,
particularly small distributed resources, is significantly less intense than
traditional centralized generating reserves.
103

Presidio, TX, on the Rio Grande border with Mexico, is connected to ERCOT by a single
60-mile transmission line built in 1948. The line goes out frequently. Instead of installing a new
transmission line, which would cost about $50 million, the transmission utility sought and
received permission from ERCOT to build a battery into its transmission asset rate base.
Nicknamed the “Big-Old Battery”, or “BOB”, the battery has a power rating of 4MW (Presidio’s
peak summer demand) and a discharge duration of 8 hours, at a cost of $25 million. The battery
also acts as a source of reactive power to ensure power quality. See In Texas, One Really Big
Battery, NPR (April 4, 2010), at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125561502.
104
See EIA, supra note __, discussing super peak prices in ERCOT.
105
The clearing price for wholesale power is equal to the highest dispatch price for any given
period of time. Thus, the clearing price—the price all sellers are paid per MWh—is set by the
most expensive and least efficient generator/seller. The cost and inefficiency of peaking resources
is orders of magnitude higher than baseload plants. See, e.g., EIA, Electric generator dispatch
depends on system demand and the relative cost of operation, at
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590 (showing hypothetical supply curve with
rapidly increasing marginal cost at and above peak load).
106
Cost-effective energy storage resources would at once increase demand during off-peak
hours and decrease demand during on-peak hours. Consequently, storage increases the capacity
factor of the cheaper, more efficient generation fleet, and reduces the capacity factor of the less
efficient, more expensive fleet. The latter may very well be pushed out of the generation stack
altogether.
107
See, e.g., KEMA, Emissions Comparison for a 20MW Flywheel-based Frequency
Regulation Power Plant (May 2007), available at
http://www.beaconpower.com/files/KEMA_Report_Emissions_Comparisons_July_%202007.pdf.
108
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, MOVING ENERGY STORAGE FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY:
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON’S APPROACH TO EVALUATING ENERGY STORAGE CURRENTLY, at
78 (2011), available at
http://www.edison.com/files/WhitePaper_SCEsApproachtoEvaluatingEnergyStorage.pdf.
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Maximizing the capacity factor of renewable resources: Energy
storage devices are efficiency-enhancing technologies for renewable resources.
Many renewable energy resources, wind and solar in particular, are variable, nondispatchable resources, whose output can neither be entirely controlled nor
predicted. By shifting excess off-peak wind energy to meet on-peak demand,
high-energy storage resources could firm variable capacity and maximize the
utility of renewable resources. Without storage, output from variable clean
resources may at times exceed system demand, and thus go wasted.109 Storing
unneeded off-peak energy for use during peak hours would enhance system
efficiency and increase revenues for these inflexible but cost-effective generators.
Enabling renewables integration: Equally important, storage can
address severe reliability concerns that may otherwise limit increased penetration
of renewables.110 On the one hand, the grid must be kept reliable. On the other
hand, maintaining reliability by ramping up and ramping down inefficient fossil
fuel plants, although a means to grid stability, would substantially undermine the
central purpose of developing renewables in the first place: reducing GHG
emissions.111 Subsequently, clean energy storage has gained significant attention
in recent years. In particular, batteries and flywheels would be effective for
smoothing variable output and providing rapid frequency and voltage control.112
Fast-ramping storage resources would also be effective for handling predictable
but more significant fluctuations in net load.113 For example, the graph below
shows CAISO’s projected net load through 2020. The projected net daytime load
decreases from 2013 to 2020, due to increasing penetration of RPS-driven
daytime solar output.114 Subsequently, the net load difference between daytime
and evening peak increases sharply, resulting in a very rapid, significant change in

109

See supra, note 62, relating to CAISO’s estimate that wind capacity will soon exceed offpeak demand by 3,000 to 5,000MW in its region. See supra note __, discussing negative
wholesale prices.
110
See, e.g., AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY ON THE
GRID, at 3 (2010) (“As renewable generation grows it will ultimately overwhelm the ability of
conventional resources to compensate renewable variability, and require the capture of electricity
generated by wind, solar and other renewables for later use.”).
111
A Carnegie Mellon University study estimated that 20 percent of the CO2 emission
reduction and up 100 percent of the NOX emission reduction expected from introducing wind and
solar power will be lost because of the extra ramping requirements they impose on traditional
generation. Katzenstein, W., and Jay Apt, Air Emissions Due To Wind and Solar Power,
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (2009) 43, 253-258, available at
http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es801437t
112
The largest grid-deployed battery attached to a wind farm was recently brought online in
Texas. See DOE, Smoothing Renewable Wind Energy in Texas (April 9, 2013),
http://energy.gov/articles/smoothing-renewable-wind-energy-texas.
113
Net load is gross load minus non-dispatchable renewable generation. Thus, it is the load
that a grid operator must satisfy through dispatchable resources.
114
Mark Rothleder, CAISO, Long Term Resource Adequacy Summit, Presentation at 3
(February 26, 2012), available at http://www.caiso.com/Documents/PresentationMark_Rothleder_CaliforniaISO.pdf. This graph is nicknamed the “Duck Graph”, for obvious
reasons.
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net load during dusk and early evening.115 Fast ramping energy storage resources
will be critical in maintaining system stability during these periods of rapid and
volatile net load change.

Projected net load in CAISO through 2020.

116

Enabling distributed renewable generation: Increased penetration of
distributed renewable generation—especially PV panels on rooftops117—raises
distribution-side reliability problems because PV has variable output and causes
voltage instabilities. 118 In decentralized deployment, whether as CES or at
individual load sites, storage would facilitate more widespread installation of
distributed solar PV generation by providing critical distribution-side reliability
services, like voltage control and power quality.119
Enabling electric vehicle integration: EVs will constitute an increasing
portion of the United States vehicle fleet in coming years.120 When charging, EVs
are significant loads. In areas with high EV penetration, handling EV-related
115

Id. The rapid change in net load is like the net velocity of two cars driving in opposite
directions on a highway. Each may be moving 60 mph, but combined, their net velocity is 120
mph. In the graph, solar generation drops off just a bulk of the population returns home for
energy-intensive evening activities, involving air conditioners, televisions, and other load-heavy
end uses. The net load result is dramatic.
116
Id.
117
California, for example, has already installed over 1.5 GW of rooftop distributed PV
generation. See Chris Clarke, KCET, ReWire (March 14, 2013), at
http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/solar/photovoltaic-pv/a-different-solar-milestone-15-gigawattsof-rooftop-in-california.html.
118
See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 15-16.
119
See id.
120
See, e.g., Pike Research, Press Release, Worldwide Electric Vehicle Sales to Reach 3.8
Million Annually by 2020 (January 3, 2013), at
http://www.navigantresearch.com/newsroom/worldwide-electric-vehicle-sales-to-reach-3-8million-annually-by-2020.
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demand will involve novel grid reliability challenges. Fast-ramping and accurate
storage resources can address these reliability concerns, easing the integration of
EV load into the grid.121 Simultaneously, EVs can be utilized as storage resources
themselves, in particular for providing grid support functions.122 As a revenue
opportunity for EV owners, the establishment of vehicle-to-grid market rules and
operational protocol could incentivize more widespread adoption of EVs.123
II. ELECTRICITY REGULATION AND ENERGY STORAGE: BARRIERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES
Advanced storage resources clearly hold great promise.
Recent
developments in federal electricity regulation have opened opportunities for
storage, at times directly targeting discriminatory rules and practices that kept
energy storage from competing on a level playing field with other resources. But
unjustified barriers remain, in both organized wholesale markets and regions with
incumbent transmission utilities. After briefly introducing the structure and
functions of federal electricity regulation, this section discusses particular
opportunities and barriers to grid-deployed storage, focusing particularly on
FERC orders and policies.
A. Background
1. FERC Jurisdiction and Statutory Mandate
In simple terms, electricity is subject to jurisdiction divided between the
states and the federal government. The boundaries of federal jurisdiction remain
grounded in the Federal Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”), which vested in the Federal
Power Commission (now FERC) plenary jurisdiction to regulate the
“transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce”.124 The FPA defines “sale of electric
energy at wholesale” as “a sale of electric energy to any person for resale”.125
While FERC’s jurisdiction extends only to wholesale transactions, its authority is
broadly construed to reach a variety of intrastate wholesale transactions by virtue
121

See CEC 2020, supra note __, at 180-81. (“The delivery of so much electrical power in a
short period of time could stress the local distribution network, so the addition of energy storage
between the grid and Level 3 [EV] chargers could provide needed buffering.”).
122
See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, In Two-Way Charging, Electric Cars Begin to Earn Money
From the Grid, N.Y. TIMES (April 25, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/energy-environment/electric-vehicles-begin-toearn-money-from-the-grid.html
123
See id. (“When the cars work with the grid, they earn about $5 a day, which comes to
about $1,800 a year”.).
124
16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. Prior to the FPA, states regulated all aspects of electric utility
service, until state authority over interstate electricity transactions was invalidated under the
dormant Commerce Clause. See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam Co., 273 U.S. 83
(1927). Congress enacted the FPA to fill the so-called “Attleboro gap”, in which interstate power
transactions and transmission were subject to no regulator,.
125
16 U.S.C.A. § 824(d).
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of the grid’s interconnectedness and essentially interstate character.126 FERC’s
jurisdiction over interstate transmission is yet more broadly construed, extending
not only to interstate transmissions of wholesale power, but also interstate
transmission of unbundled retail electricity.127 In practice, FERC regulates the
rates, terms, and, conditions of wholesale sales of electric power for resale in
interstate commerce, and the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate
transmission.
Notwithstanding the FPA’s broad grant of authority, the statute limits
FERC’s authority to “those matters which are not subject to regulation by the
States”.128 The FPA expressly reserves state jurisdiction over “facilities used for
the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or
only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce”. 129 In
practice, state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) regulate the retail rates
charged to end-use consumers, the lower-voltage distribution infrastructure that
delivers electricity to end users, and the construction and siting of transmission
and generation facilities.130
“[W]ith respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission”, FERC must ensure that rates are “just and reasonable” and not
unduly discriminatory or preferential.131 Traditionally, FERC has utilized a “costof-service” approach to rate regulation, setting rates to meet revenue requirements
that provide a rate of return on equity adequate to attract investors.132 Courts
initially interpreted the “just and reasonable” standard as requiring agencies to
employ a particular cost-of-service methodology, until 1944 when the Supreme
Court held that the “result reached” in the ratemaking process, rather than the
126

See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972)
(sufficient to show that power from intrastate transaction “commingled” with power from
interstate transaction); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943) (sufficient to
show that party in intrastate transaction was “no more than a funnel” to party out of state). Cf. 16
U.S.C.A. § 824 (“[E]lectric energy shall be held to be transmitted in interstate commerce if
transmitted from a State and consumed at any point outside thereof”.).
127
In New York v. F.E.R.C., the Supreme Court held that the plain language of the FPA
supported the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission in
interstate commerce. “The unbundled retail transmissions targeted by FERC are indeed
transmissions of ‘electric energy in interstate commerce,’ [16 U.S.C. § 824(b),] because of the
nature of the national grid. There is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission
jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC's sale jurisdiction to
that at wholesale.” 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002) (emphasis in original). See also Transmission Access
Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (decision below).
128
16 U.S.C. § 824(a).
129
Id. § 824(b)(1).
130
See Fred BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS, at 683 (3rd ed. 2010).
131
16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)-(b).
132
“The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness
of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and
support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public
duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes
affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and business conditions generally.”
Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 693 (1923).
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methodology used, would determine whether the rate was “just and reasonable”
under the FPA.133
Within its zone of ratemaking discretion,134 FERC began in the early
1980s to entertain what were, at the time, “highly unusual” rate filings, requesting
approval of “market-based” (rather than cost-of-service) rates for wholesale
power.135 FERC determined that negotiated market-based rates are “just and
reasonable” under the FPA, but the entity proposing such rates must not have, or
must have adequately mitigated, market power in generation and transmission and
must not control other barriers to entry. 136 Rather than specifically approve
market-based rates, the Commission grants market actors market-based rate
authority, pursuant to rules codified through a number of orders.137 FERC has
approved a number of storage facilities for market-based rate authority.138 Over
ninety-nine percent of wholesale power transactions occur under market-based
rates, whether through bilateral agreements or organized markets, while nearly all
transmission service is offered under cost-of-service rates.139
2. Grid Operators: ISO/RTOs and Transmission Utilities
In encouraging market-based rates and competition among wholesale
generators and sellers, the Commission has promoted the creation of organized
133

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). In the Permian
Basin Rate Cases, the Supreme Court further held that a court must uphold an agency’s decision to
authorize particular rates if those rates fall within a “zone of reasonableness.” In re Permian Basin
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968) (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U. S. 575, 585 (1942)). Judge David Bazelon once described the “zone of reasonableness” as
“bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and at the other by the consumer
interest against exorbitant rates”. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir.
1950).
134
In considering FERC’s tariff-approving authority, the Supreme Court has emphasized “that
the just and reasonable standard does not compel the Commission to use any single pricing
formula”. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S.
211, 224 (1991) (discussing the “just and reasonable” requirement in the natural gas context).
135
Re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico et al., 25 FERC ¶ 61469 (Dec. 30, 1983).
136
See, e.g., Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61210 (Aug. 8, 1989). Courts have
approved FERC’s use of market-based rates as consistent with the FPA’s “just and reasonable”
standard. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. F.E.R.C., 383 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2004);
Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. F.E.R.C., 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The economic
policy argument for authorizing market-based power rates is simple: transmission and distribution
are natural monopolies, but the generation and sale of electricity itself is not. See David B.
Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev.
417, 418 (2005). Competition, in theory, increases efficiency and drives down prices for
consumers, leading to inherently more just and reasonable rates.
137
See Order No. 697, Mkt.-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Elec. Energy, Capacity &
Ancillary Services by Pub. Utilities, 119 FERC ¶ 61295 (June 21, 2007), order on reh’g, 121
FERC ¶ 61260 (Dec. 14, 2007); order on reh’g, 131 FERC ¶ 61021 (Apr. 15, 2010).
138
See, e.g., FERC, Letter order conditionally accepting Stephentown Regulation Services,
LLC's 6/7/10 filing of an application for market-based rate authority with an accompanying rate
schedule, effective 8/2/10 under ER10-1403, available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=12386870.
139
See FERC EQRs. However, some market-based rates have also emerged to a lesser degree
for transmission. See Heidi Werntz, Let's Make A Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant
Transmission, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 421 (2011).
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wholesale markets and independent grid operators, called Independent System
Operators (“ISOs”) or Regional Transmission Operators (“RTOs”).140 There are
currently six independent operators in the United States that are subject to
FERC,141 which together with ERCOT in Texas, service two-thirds of electricity
consumers in the United States. 142 ISO/RTOs administer the grid under
OATTs 143 filed on behalf of transmission owners, under which transmission
customers pay regulated rates for transmission service. Under rules promulgated
by FERC,144 RTOs/ISOs perform the following tasks:
•
•

•

•

Dispatch—the commands to turn on, turn off, hold in readiness, or repair
significant generating units;
Transmission scheduling—the decisions to open, close, or reserve
transmission lines and to schedule, implement or defer desired
maintenance;
Planning—the projection of expected demand and potential and preferred
ways of meeting that demand, whether through capacity auctions or
resource adequacy requirements;
Market management—conducting auctions for energy and ancillary
services which give participants the price signals to match scheduled load
with expected demand;

140

Organized wholesale markets for energy, capacity, and ancillary services emerged from
FERC Orders No. 888, 889, and 2000. Order No. 888 established the foundation for competitive
electricity markets, by requiring open, nondiscriminatory access to transmission facilities. Order
No. 888 specifically required transmission utilities to file a nondiscriminatory open access
transmission tariff (“OATT”), separately stating (i.e. “unbundling”) rates for energy, transmission,
and ancillary services. In addition, Order No. 888 required transmission utilities to take
transmission service under the OATT on equal terms with non-utility users, such as IPPs. Order
No. 888 also encouraged utilities to cede functional control of transmission assets to an ISO, to
avoid conflicts of interest and ensure nondiscriminatory open access for non-utility generators.
Order No. 2000 further encouraged formation of RTOs to transfer functional control of the bulk
power system to an independent operator, and promote regional coordination of transmission
facilities. The Commission provided comprehensive guidelines as to the minimum functions and
characteristics of properly organized RTOs. Notably, neither Order No. 888 nor Order No. 2000
required formation of such independent operators; thus, grid operators in some regions are
ISO/RTOs, and in others the incumbent transmission utilities retain control. See Clinton A. Vince,
Sherry A. Quirk, Stanley P. Wolf, Travis R. Smith, Sandra & Barbulescu, Monica Berry, What Is
Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 27 Energy L.J. 65, 66-74 (2006).
141
The following RTOs and ISOs are subject to FERC: PJM Interconnection, LLC (“PJM”);
New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (“NYISO”); Midwest Independent Transmission
System Operator, Inc. (“MISO”); ISO New England Inc. (“ISO-NE”); California Independent
System Operator Corp. (“CAISO”); and Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (“SPP”).
142
See ISO/RTO Council, Homepage, at http://www.isorto.org/. The Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) is not subject to FERC under the FPA because the ERCOT grid does
not synchronously interconnect with any facilities outside the state of Texas, and thus does not
engage in interstate transmission or interstate wholesale power transactions.
143
See supra, note 139, discussing OATTs under Order No. 888.
144
An independent operator is a “public utility” subject to FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA.
See 16 U.S.C. § 824(e). FERC may withdraw its market-based rate authorization for an ISO/RTO
that does not comply with its directives.
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•
•

Market monitoring—maintaining market discipline based upon monitoring
for and enforcement of sanctions for that abuse; and
Rate collection—the collection of billions of dollars through charges on
the use of monopoly transmission facilities to be distributed to
transmission owners in ways that will compensate past and incentivize
future investment.145

On the other hand, other regional grids outside the RTOs/ISOs—
particularly the Southeast, Southwest, Inter-Mountain West, and Northwest—
remain operated by traditional, vertically-integrated utilities.146 In those regions,
the utilities retain operational control and reliability responsibilities for
transmission service. Non-utility entities can utilize transmission facilities
pursuant to an OATT, which in theory provides open nondiscriminatory
transmission service for IPPs and other third-party service providers; however, in
practice, the utilities can freely satisfy power and other service requirements with
their own facilities, rather than buying services from IPPs or others. In these
markets, independent energy providers generally engage in bilateral contracts
with incumbent utilities, LSEs, or directly with bulk loads (e.g. industrial or large
commercial facilities).
B. Ancillary Services
Ancillary services are services necessary to ensure that capacity and
energy are capable of constantly matching bulk load. Historically, ancillary
services have been performed by traditional generators. In Order No. 890, FERC
amended its pro forma OATT to require that ISO/RTOs and transmission utilities
permit “other non-generation resources” to provide ancillary services, thus
opening the opportunity for resources like storage and demand response to
provide ancillary grid functions. 147 Typically, ISO/RTOs require LSEs (i.e.
wholesale customers) to procure ancillary services in proportion to their loads,
either through self-supplying, bilateral agreements, or organized wholesale
markets. 148 Outside of ISO/RTOs, transmission utilities charge regulated
ancillary service rates, listed separately on an OATT, or permit transmission
customers to self-supply. Although transmission operators use a variety of
names, ancillary services are commonly grouped into three categories,
approximately organized from quickest response and shortest duration, to slowest
response and longest duration: primary, secondary, and tertiary frequency
control.149
145

Michael H. Dworkin & Rachel Aslin Goldwasser, Ensuring Consideration of the Public
Interest in the Governance and Accountability of Regional Transmission Organizations, 28
Energy L.J. 543, 553 (2007)
146
See Bosselman, et al., supra note __, at 656.
147
Order No. 890, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service,
72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 12,527-28 (2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37).
148
See id.
149
This framework is suggested in SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, PROJECT REPORT: A
SURVEY OF OPERATING RESERVE MARKETS IN U.S.ISO/RTO-MANAGED ELECTRIC ENERGY
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Storage resources can perform ancillary services comparably and in many
instances more reliably and efficiently, and with less environmental impact, than
traditional generators. But the Order No. 890 promise to ensure comparable
participation of non-generation resources in ancillary service markets is
incomplete. Recently, FERC has acted to remedy undue discrimination in
secondary frequency control markets, but barriers to storage resources remain in
markets for other ancillary services.
1. Primary Frequency Control: Frequency Response
Primary frequency control, or frequency response, is performed by an
automatic, autonomous resource that instantaneously adjusts output or load to
offset significant abrupt changes in frequency.150 Primary frequency control acts
to arrest a sharp drop or spike in frequency in real-time.151 It is designed to keep
the frequency within speciﬁed limits in response to the unexpected forced outage
of a generator or transmission facility, or the loss of a large load, to prevent
frequency excursions that compromise system security and could lead to a
blackout.152 Once the frequency deviation is arrested, the grid operator dispatches
secondary and tertiary frequency control resources (discussed below) to ensure
longer-duration stability.
A recent FERC-commissioned study observed that “[t]he declining quality
of frequency control in the U.S. interconnections is currently a significant
reliability concern”, and particularly emphasized that “[t]he amount of primary
frequency control reserves that are on line and always available may be reduced
as the conventional generation-based sources for these reserves are displaced by
variable renewable generation, which currently does not provide primary
frequency control”. 153 As a solution, among other measures, the study
recommended “[e]xpanded use of advanced technologies, such as energy storage”
for primary frequency control.154
Storage resources, especially batteries and flywheels, are excellent
frequency response resources, responding more quickly and accurately to sudden
frequency disturbances than conventional generators and demand response
resources. 155 Moreover, storage resources combine the characteristics of
REGIONS (September 2012), available at
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.pdf.
150
See NERC, Glossary, at http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.
151
For a description of frequency on the grid, see supra note __.
152
See Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk Power Sys., 130 FERC ¶ 61218, P6
(Mar. 18, 2010). See also U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the
August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, at 99
(April 2004), available at https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf.
153
See JOSEPH H. ETO, ET AL., USE OF FREQUENCY RESPONSE METRICS TO ASSESS THE
PLANNING AND OPERATING REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIABLE INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE
RENEWABLE GENERATION, at xvi (December 2010), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/frequencyresponsemetrics-report.pdf.
154
Id.
155
Alexandre Oudalov, Daniel Chartouni, and Christian Ohler, Optimizing a Battery Energy
Storage System for Primary Frequency Control, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 22
No. 3, at 1259 (August 2007).
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generation and demand response in a single resource, with the capability of
controlling both up (by discharging) and down (by charging). Deploying storage
for primary frequency control would replace the frequency control provided by
retiring traditional generators, and also free up generators currently serving as
frequency response resources to generate more energy (rather than reserve
capacity for performing primary frequency response).
Notwithstanding the study’s recommendation, energy storage resources
currently have extremely limited prospects as primary frequency control
resources. Primary frequency control is not provided through wholesale markets
in any of the ISO/RTOs.156 Although FERC has recognized that traditional
frequency response resources will soon become inadequate, ISO/RTOs continue
to rely on a combination of conventional generation and, to a limited extent,
demand response resources. Without a wholesale market and/or performancebased incentives for frequency response that account for storage resources’
inherently greater frequency response capabilities, storage resources have no
opportunity as frequency response resources inside or outside of organized
markets.
2. Secondary Frequency Control: Frequency Regulation
Secondary frequency control, or frequency regulation, is the rapid
injection or withdrawal of real power by facilities capable of responding
automatically to a grid operator’s signal, generally within minutes. 157 Like
frequency response, frequency regulation is critical for ensuring that, on the
margin, generation continuously matches load to maintain system frequency
within a one percent deviation from 60Hz. 158 Because of its operational
characteristics, and the existence of wholesale frequency regulation markets, the
currently most commercially viable storage application is frequency regulation.159
However, the compensation practices of most ISO/RTOs and transmission
utilities—designed for the functional characteristics of conventional generators—
do not all account for the inherently greater frequency regulation provided by

156

See SANDIA, PROJECT REPORT: A SURVEY OF OPERATING RESERVE MARKETS IN U.S.
ISO/RTO-MANAGED ELECTRIC ENERGY REGIONS, at 14, available at
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.pdf.
157
The frequency regulation signal is called an automatic generator control (AGC) signal.
Frequency regulation resources are designed to automatically respond to the AGC, rather than
require manual control. The signal is updated every 4 or 6 seconds, depending on the system.
Frequency regulation is not to be confused with primary frequency control, or frequency response.
Regulation behaves in response to the AGC, which is usually dispatched when frequency deviates
a certain percentage from its baseline, whereas frequency control/response acts automatically in
response to changes in system frequency itself. See FERC, Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064
(October 20, 2011).
158
See supra, note 84.
159
See, e.g., DAN RASTLER, ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ENERGY STORAGE
APPLICATIONS AND ECONOMICS COSTS, at 10 (April 28, 2011), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011_energypolicy/documents/2011-0428_workshop/presentations/11_EPRI_Rastler_Panel2_IEPR_Applications_and_Economics.pdf.
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certain accurate, fast-ramping storage devices.160 Laudably, FERC has recently
acted to remedy such unjust and unreasonable market rules, constituting the
Commission’s first major—albeit piecemeal—actions toward ensuring
comparable treatment of storage resources.

Frequency regulation: the regulation signal (red) is dispatched to compensate for minute-to-minute
161
discrepancies between total system load (green) and load-following generation (blue).

i. Order No. 755 and Frequency Regulation in ISO/RTOs
Through Order No. 755,162 FERC successfully identified and remedied
undue discrimination in frequency regulation markets, by requiring ISO/RTOs to
adapt market rules to account for the performance characteristics of certain
storage resources. Frequency regulation is sold and procured through organized
wholesale markets as needed to maintain grid stability. Today, most frequency
regulation is provided by traditional generators, such as fast-ramping natural gas
turbines. The faster a resource can ramp up or down, the more accurately it can
respond to the AGC signal and avoid over or under performing. Alternatively,
when a resource ramps too slowly, its ramping limitations may cause it to work
160

In May 2009, FERC approved tariff revisions making the NYISO the first grid operator in
the nation to establish provisions for limited energy storage resources (“LESRs”) to provide
regulation services in the NYISO market. See ISO/RTO COUNCIL, 2011 ISO/RTO METRICS
REPORT, at 218 (2011), available at
https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/Repository/Tariff/FERC%20Filings/2011-0831%20Docket%20No.%20AD10-5-000.pdf. But even NYISO’s rules do not adequately
compensate energy storage resources for actual regulation performance.
161
BRENDAN J. KIRBY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, FREQUENCY REGULATION BASICS AND
TRENDS, at 5 (December 2004), available at http://www.ornl.info/sci/ees/etsd/pes/pubs/TM2004291_Frequency_Regulation_Basics_and_Trends.pdf.
162
Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064 (Issued October 20, 2011).
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against the needs of the system and force the system operator to commit
additional regulation resources to compensate.163
Under compensation practices prior to Order No. 755, resources were not
compensated for actual frequency regulation provided to the grid. In many
instances resources affording inherently different levels of regulation were
compensated identically. For example, the Commission found that some
ISO/RTOs compensated regulation resources for a flat rate based simply on the
amount of capacity devoted to regulation, plus a payment or charge for net energy
used.164 Thus, for example, 10MW of flywheel capacity might be compensated
equal to or less than 10MW of natural gas plant capacity, even where the battery
had tracked the dispatch signal with far greater precision and effectively
committed 20MW of capacity (10MW down, plus 10MW up), thus affording the
system substantially more regulation service.

Relative frequency regulation of conventional generator (red) and a flywheel (blue), in following
regulation signal. These resources would be compensated identically under pre-Order No. 755
165
rules in most ISO/RTOs.

163

See id. at P4-5.
See SANDIA, PROJECT REPORT: A SURVEY OF OPERATING RESERVE MARKETS IN U.S.
ISO/RTO-MANAGED ELECTRIC ENERGY REGIONS, at 14, available at
http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.pdf.
165
Beacon Power Co., Performance of First 20MW Commercial Flywheel Frequency
Regulation Plant, at 18 (2011), at
http://www.beaconpower.com/files/Beacon_Power_presentation_ESA%206_7_11_FINAL.pdf.
164
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In response to this and other discriminatory rules in frequency regulation
markets, Order No. 755 mandates that ISO/RTOs compensate for actual
frequency regulation performed, through a two-part payment: (1) payment for
performance that reflects the quantity of frequency regulation service provided by
a resource when the resource is accurately following the dispatch signal, and (2) a
capacity payment reflecting the marginal unit’s opportunity costs.166
The first, the so-called “mileage payment”,167 ensures that resources are
compensated for their actual performance, based on the absolute amount of
regulation up and down a resource provides in response to the system operator’s
dispatch signal. As in the above graphic example, fast-ramping resources can
perform substantially more frequency regulation work than a traditional slowerramping resource in a given period of time.168 Moreover, storage devices can
regulate down, by charging and actually taking generation in excess of load off
the grid. Regulating down is as important to grid reliability as regulating up, but
many organized markets have no mechanism for compensating such performance
because, quite simply, the rules were designed for traditional generators, which
can only regulate up. FERC also specifically required that the performance
payment be market-based, to ensure the least-cost and most efficient dispatch of
regulation resources. 169 Layered onto the mileage payment, FERC required
compensation to account for the accuracy with which a regulation resource tracks
the operator’s dispatch signal. Batteries and flywheels generally track dispatch
signals with far higher precision and accuracy than traditional generators,
providing high value regulation while avoiding costly inaccuracies that might
require additional corrective regulation. Although FERC did not require any
particular accuracy metric, the Commission required that all resources be gauged
by the same one.170
Similarly, the Commission required that all resources be compensated at a
uniform market-based capacity payment equal to the marginal unit’s stated
opportunity cost. FERC required a uniform clearing price, to ensure an efficient
preference for resources with lower opportunity costs of participating in
regulation (rather than other, e.g. energy) markets.171
In Order No. 755, FERC identified and remedied market rules that did not
adequately account for the novel operational characteristics of certain storage
resources. In doing so, FERC leveled the playing field for a variety of new
technologies, particularly batteries and flywheels, while making the market for
166

See Order No. 755.
The mileage payment is so called because it compensates for the distance traveled,
regardless of whether the movement was up or down. FERC seems unwilling to define the
performance payment without absolute actual mileage as a component. For example, the
Commission rejected PJM’s Order No. 755 compliance filing to the extent it did not make the
performance payment specifically contingent on total mileage, “find[ing] that the regulatory text
adopted by Order No. 755 is clear”. See P.J.M. Interconnection, LLC, 141 FERC ¶ 61,134, at P16
(November 16, 2012).
168
See also KEMA, supra note __, at 6.
169
See Order No. 755, at P128-30.
170
See id. at P153.
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See id. at P99.
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frequency regulation more competitive and efficient. 172 The elimination of
barriers in the provision of frequency regulation is critical, considering regulation
is a key service for integrating variable renewable resources. 173 As of this
writing, the ISO/RTOs are at various stages of implementing Order No. 755.174
ii. Frequency Regulation Outside the ISO/RTOs
Order No. 755 does not apply outside of ISO/RTOs, where the
transmission utilities retain operational control of the grid, and where there are no
organized wholesale markets for ancillary services.175 Outside of ISO/RTOs,
transmission utilities must ensure grid reliability, and thus an adequate provision
of ancillary services. The procurement duty and cost of ancillary services falls on
transmission customers (such as LSEs). One option for customers is to pay the
transmission utility a regulated rate (stated in the OATT) for ancillary services. In
that case, the transmission utility would either own and operate ancillary service
resources, or procure such services through bilateral market-based agreements
with third parties.176 Alternatively, customers can self-supply, either with their
own ancillary service facilities, or bilateral agreements with third-parties.177
To remedy barriers similar to those targeted in Order No. 755, FERC
recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) addressing ancillary
service procurement and compensation outside of organized markets.178 Partly to
eliminate barriers to storage where customers choose to self-supply regulation and
frequency response outside of ISO/RTOs, the Commission proposed to require
each public utility transmission provider to include provisions in its OATT
explaining how it will determine regulation and frequency response service
reserve requirements in a manner that takes into account the speed and accuracy
of resources used.179 Transmission utilities generally state customers’ reserve
requirements in simple quantities of capacity, i.e. MWs, without accounting for
the performance characteristics of the resource providing frequency regulation or
response. Consequently, if a customer chooses to self-supply (whether through
ownership or third-party agreement), under prevailing requirements it would be
172

See KEMA, supra note __, at 6.
See JOSEPH H. ETO, ET AL., USE OF FREQUENCY RESPONSE METRICS TO ASSESS THE
PLANNING AND OPERATING REQUIREMENTS FOR RELIABLE INTEGRATION OF VARIABLE
RENEWABLE GENERATION, at xvi (December 2010), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/frequencyresponsemetrics-report.pdf.
174
See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 141 FERC ¶ 61134 (Nov. 16, 2012); New York Indep.
Sys. Operator, Inc., 141 FERC ¶ 61105 (Nov. 6, 2012); California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 140
FERC ¶ 61206 (Sept. 20, 2012); Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 140 FERC ¶
61224 (Sept. 20, 2012); PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61130 (May 17, 2012).
175
Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting for New
Electric Storage Technologies, 139 FERC ¶ 61,245, at P47 (June 22, 2012) (hereinafter “Storage
NOPR”).
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The latter option is in theory possible but in practice non-existent. See infra, discussing
Avista.
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See, e.g., Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,716; pro forma OATT,
Original Sheet Nos. 20-21 and Schedule 3, Original Sheet No. 113.
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See Storage NOPR, supra note __.
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See id. at P49.
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irrational to utilize a quick and accurate resource that is more cost-effective per
amount of frequency regulation or response provided, if it is more expensive per
MW of capacity. Thus, the Commission has preliminarily found that accounting
for speed and accuracy in a public utility transmission provider’s determination of
regulation and frequency response reserve requirements is necessary to address
the potential for undue discrimination against customers choosing to self-supply
their regulation and frequency response needs.180
The NOPR also seeks to eliminate barriers to storage where a transmission
utility decides to procure frequency regulation and response services through
market-based agreements with third-parties, in satisfying the utility’s own duty to
offer customers ancillary services at regulated rates through its OATT.181 In such
circumstances, the Commission’s current policy requires a potential ancillary
service provider to perform a market power study demonstrating a lack of market
power for the particular ancillary service in the particular geographic market.182
However, partly because information required to perform the market power study
is unavailable, the Commission has found that “the effect of the Avista policy is to
categorically prohibit sales of ancillary services to public utility transmission
providers outside of the RTO and ISO markets”.183
The finer points of the Commission’s market power policy and its
proposals for reforming the Avista policy are beyond the scope of this Article.184
Unlike other aspects of the NOPR, the Commission’s concern is not prompted
directly by the novel operational characteristics of emerging storage technologies.
Indeed, the Commission’s goal is to loosen Avista’s general stranglehold on
180

See id. 52.
See id. at P6. That is, the customer does not want to self-supply, thus it must pay the
transmission utility for the ancillary services incident to its transmission service. The transmission
utility must offer such services, and can do so either through owning and operating its own
ancillary service resource, or through bilateral market-based agreements with third-parties. The
current NOPR addresses the later situation.
182
See Avista Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,223 (Avista), order on reh’g, 89 FERC ¶ 61,136 (1999).
The Commission must ensure that market-based rates are just and reasonable, primarily by
ensuring that parties lack market power. In Avista, the Commission determined that requiring
applicants for market-based rates in ancillary services to perform market power studies poses
insurmountable barriers because the information needed to perform such studies is unavailable.
Thus, the Commission permits a third-party supplier to sell ancillary services at market-based
rates without showing a lack of market power in certain circumstances. For example, where
selling ancillary services to transmission customers, the Commission reasoned that a third-party
ancillary service provider would not be able to charge unjust or unreasonable rates because the
customer could always fall back to the regulated OATT rates. However, the Commission did not
exempt third parties offering ancillary services to a transmission utility. The Commission
reasoned that “the public utility’s ability to recover such purchase costs in OATT rates might lead
it to agree to above-market purchases, which would then be incorporated into the public utility’s
OATT ancillary service rate and gradually increase that rate. This increase in turn would reduce
the ability of the cost-based OATT rate to serve as an alternative to the third-party market based
rate, and thus undermine the mitigation measure that the Commission relied upon in Avista to
enable relaxation of the requirement for a market power analysis.” The NOPR revisits this policy,
considering whether third party ancillary service providers should be more flexibly permitted to
exercise market-based rate authority.
183
Storage NOPR, supra note __, at P11.
184
See id. at P13-46.
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market-based ancillary service provision to transmission utilities, without regard
to the resource providing such services. However, lowered barriers to supplying
transmission utilities with ancillary services through market-based rates will open
opportunities for storage to the extent storage resources are cost-effective and the
utilities’ procurement decisions account for the inherently faster and more
accurate performance of certain storage technologies.185 Indeed, among the most
significant barriers to storage deployment is the limited opportunity to engage in
long-term service contracts with transmission utilities (because of the Avista
policy). Without long-term contracts (or the ability to participate in capacity
markets, see infra, section II.C.), storage projects cannot secure long-term
revenue streams, increasing investment risk and making it difficult to secure
financing for development and capital costs. Loosening the Avista policy will
eliminate barriers to such long-term contracts, and thus facilitate storage resource
deployment.
3. Tertiary Frequency Control: Spinning and Non-Spinning Reserves
Tertiary frequency control consists of manual changes in scheduled unit
commitment and dispatch levels in order to bring frequency back to ideal values
when secondary frequency control is unable to perform this task. 186 The
ISO/RTOs use a variety of terms for tertiary ancillary services, but generally
speaking, there are two basic categories: spinning and non-spinning reserves.187
To provide spinning reserve, a resource must be synchronized to the grid and
must be able to reach the declared output level within a short time interval: e.g.,
ten minutes for a ten-minute spinning reserve.188 In contrast, ten-minute non185

Because transmission utilities are required under the NOPR to account for the speed and
accuracy of frequency regulation and response resources in setting procurement requirements, and
under their OATT utilities must take transmission service on the same rates, terms, and conditions
as customers, once in compliance, utilities should be incentivized to prefer performance over mere
capacity to the extent such resources are cost-effective.
186
SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, PROJECT REPORT: A SURVEY OF OPERATING RESERVE
MARKETS IN U.S.ISO/RTO-MANAGED ELECTRIC ENERGY REGIONS, AT 13 (September 2012),
available at http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.pdf.
187
See FERC, Preventing Undue Discrimination & Preference in Transmission Serv., 123
FERC ¶ 61299 (June 23, 2008) (pro forma OATT, Schedule 5-6). The seven energy regions also
provide for another category of reserve, less ﬂexible than ten minute spinning and non-spinning
reserve, which is called “supplemental” by PJM, “replacement” by ERCOT, “operating” by ISONE, and “30-minute” by NYISO. This reserve generally includes resources that are either
synchronized or non-synchronized to the grid and that can be brought up to the declared level of
output within thirty minutes. The purpose of this reserve is to restore the ten-minute spinning and
non-spinning reserve after a contingency has occurred. This frees up the spinning and nonspinning generating units to again provide ten-minute spinning and non-spinning reserve, allowing
the system to be ready for a second contingency. One energy region, NYISO, formally divides its
30-minute reserve category into two sub-categories: namely, a 30- minute spinning reserve, and a
30-minute non-synchronized reserve. See SANDIA LABS, supra note __, at 16.
188
A spinning reserve is so-called because it is usually provided by a resource that is
synchronized with the grid and already running. For example, a CCGT plant running at half
capacity might be a spinning reserve. On the other hand, a non-spinning reserve is usually not
synchronized with the grid nor already running. For example, an oil generator capable of being
turned on and ramped up within ten minutes might provide non-spinning reserve service.
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spinning reserve can be offered by an off-line resource, but it must be able to be
synchronized to the grid and brought up to the declared output level within ten
minutes. Spinning and non-spinning reserves provide frequency regulation in the
event of a system contingency, like an unexpected loss of generation or
transmission resources, but also provide load following reserves. Load following
is the action of following the general trending load pattern within a day, and is
usually performed by the economic dispatch of spinning reserve, but can also
involve the dispatch of quick-start non-spinning reserves.189
Most of the ISO/RTOs require that a resource be able to provide
continuous output for some speciﬁed duration of time in order to qualify as a
reserve provider. For example, CAISO requires that spinning and/or nonspinning reserve resources be able to maintain a constant level of power output
for a minimum of 30 minutes, whereas ISO-NE and MISO require such resources
to be able to maintain a constant power output for a minimum of 60 minutes.190
Thus, certain storage resources should be able to participate in spinning and nonspinning reserve markets. However, most flywheels would not, because they
usually can only discharge for about fifteen minutes at their rated capacity.191
Minimum duration requirements serve the operational need to manage
medium- to longer-duration reserve requirements, and shorter duration products
are more appropriately primary or secondary frequency control mechanisms.
While flywheels are not ideal tertiary frequency control providers, other storage
resources, including batteries and PSH, could perform as spinning or nonspinning reserves and as load following. Nonetheless, as with secondary
frequency control markets, the ISO/RTOs do not adequately account for the
valuable operational characteristics of storage resources. For example, spinning
and non-spinning reserves are often defined as resources that can respond within
ten minutes, a vestige of the operational characteristics of traditional load
following resources like natural gas turbines. But storage is capable of nearinstantaneous response and sustained discharge. Current market rules in tertiary
frequency control markets—no less than in secondary—do not adequately
account for or incentivize the performance characteristics of certain storage
resources. Consequently, tertiary frequency control compensation mechanisms
undervalue quick-response, rapid ramping, and accurate storage resources,
resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates. Because storage resources are
underincentivized, spinning and non-spinning reserve markets are inefficient,
resulting in higher prices for consumers and a less reliable and more GHGintensive power system.
C. Capacity Markets and Resource Adequacy Requirements
For much of the history of the electric power industry, vertically integrated
utilities planned for and built generation resources, which were then incorporated
into their rate base and paid for by ratepayers.192 Since the introduction of
189

See SANDIA LABS, supra note __, at 16.
See id. at 18.
191
See supra, section I.C.
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market-based rates and wholesale competition (not to mention retail competition),
LSEs increasingly purchase energy from IPPs through wholesale markets or
bilateral agreements.193 Consequently, utilities—especially those participating in
organized wholesale markets—are less concerned with long-term planning needed
to ensure that the development and maintenance of generation resources matches
future load-side requirements. At the same time, revenue from energy and
ancillary service sales is usually insufficient to cover the production costs, fixed
O&M, and capital investments of new generation because the cost of wholesale
power generally covers only the marginal, or variable, cost of generation.194 In
short, in organized wholesale markets utilities have insufficient incentive to plan
for long-term generation requirements, and energy and ancillary service revenues
alone are inadequate to incentivize investment in new generation resources.
In response to this resource-planning deficit, certain organized wholesale
markets have developed mechanisms to ensure the development and maintenance
of generation resources by compensating for their fixed costs. 195 These
mechanisms are called by various names, but are typically called resource
adequacy requirements, or when procured through a market, capacity markets.196
ISO/RTOs generally set installed capacity targets for a given period (for example,
a one-year commitment period three years in advance) with locational variation
depending on the load and transmission constraints of different zones. 197
ISO/RTOs make capacity procurement the obligation of each utility or LSE.198
When a resource sells capacity, it commits to reserve that amount of generating
capacity during a commitment period, in the event the resource is needed to
satisfy demand.
193

About one third of all power consumed in the United States is generated by IPPs. See EIA,
Electric Power Annual 2011, at Table 1.3 (January 2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf.
194
See MARK GRIFFITH, VENTYX, CAPACITY MARKETS DEMYSTIFIED, at 4 (2008), available
at http://www.energycentral.com/download/products/wp08-capacity-markets-demystified.pdf
195
The ISO/RTOs with capacity markets include NYISO, ISO-NE, PJM, and MISO. CAISO
is considering a capacity market but has not instituted one. See CAISO, Capacity Markets, at
http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/StakeholderProcesses/CompletedStakeholderProcesses/Cap
acityMarkets.aspx.
196
Capacity markets are critical for incentivizing efficient market entrants. A prospective
investor estimates the cost of investment over the life of a project minus the expected variable
profits from providing energy and ancillary services (after netting the associated variable costs).
This difference between investment costs and variable profits, which is known as Net Cost of New
Entry (“Net CONE”), is the estimated capacity revenue that would be necessary for the investment
to be profitable. In an efficient market, the investments with the lowest Net CONE will be the
first to occur. See DaVID B. PATTON, ET AL., 2011 ASSESSMENT OF THE ISO NEW ENGLAND
ELECTRICITY MARKETS, at 106-7 (2012), available at http://www.isone.com/markets/mktmonmit/rpts/ind_mkt_advsr/emm_mrkt_rprt.pdf
197
NERC reliability standards require ISO/RTOs to maintain a capacity reserve margin
sufficient to satisfy a “one day in ten year” probability of median forecast peak load exceeding
installed capacity, or a “loss of load” event. See Planning Resource Adequacy Analysis,
Assessment and Documentation, NERC Standard BAL-502-RFC-02, available at
http://www.nerc.com/files/BAL-502-RFC-02.pdf.
198
See, e.g., NYISO, Installed Capacity Manual, Section 3.2 (2013), available at
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/documents/Manuals_and_Guides/Man
uals/Operations/icap_mnl.pdf
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In particular, capacity payments provide a significant stream of revenue
that contributes to the recovery of total costs for new and existing peaking units.
Peaking units dispatch only during certain periods of high demand, with capacity
factors on average around 8-10%.199 Their high marginal costs command high
energy prices when dispatched (and, indeed, usually set the clearing price during
peak periods), but revenue from energy alone is generally insufficient to cover the
total costs of peaking resources. Thus, peaking plants rely heavily on capacity
revenues to cover fixed costs. The capacity market is also a significant source of
net revenue to cover the fixed costs of investing in new intermediate and base
load units, but capacity revenues are a larger part of net revenue for peaking units.
For example, for the year 2012, PJM estimated that a hypothetical gas
turbine running as a peaking resource might have net energy revenues of $23,240
and net capacity revenues of $30,116.200 Thus, capacity constituted 55% of net
revenues for a gas turbine peaking facility. On the other hand, PJM estimated that
a hypothetical CCGT (likely running as an intermediate or baseload resource)
would have net energy revenues of $97,260, and net capacity revenues of
$31,422, or 24% capacity payments as a share of net revenues.201 Indeed, overall,
capacity payments constitute the second greatest component of PJM’s overall
wholesale costs—about 18% in 2010.
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See PJM, State of the Market 2012, at 190 (2013), available at
http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/PJM_State_of_the_Market/2012/2012-som-pjmvolume2-sec6.pdf; U.S. Energy Information Administration/Electric Power Annual 2009, Table
5.2 (April 2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482009.pdf.
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See PJM State of the Market 2012, supra note __, at 193.
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Components of PJM Total Wholesale Power Cost, 2010

202

Advanced storage technologies are well suited to ensure resource
adequacy by functioning as peaking capacity (by shifting low-cost, off-peak
energy to meet high-cost peak load). But storage resources are not permitted to
participate in most resource adequacy planning, even though they satisfy the basic
criteria of a capacity resource. As a matter of policy rather than operational
rationale, most of the RTOs/ISOs prohibit storage from participating in capacity
markets and resource adequacy planning.203 Thus, storage resources are generally
limited to revenue from ancillary service and—for longer-duration, energyintensive devices—energy markets. In other ISO/RTOs without organized
capacity markets, LSEs must satisfy capacity reserve margins through bilateral
agreements or self-supplying, but similarly, those ISO/RTOs do not permit LSEs
to satisfy their capacity requirements with storage capacity. Storage resources
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PJM Market Highlights 2010, at 2, available at
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/20110513-2010-pjm-market-highlights.ashx.
203
NYISO is one of the few ISO/RTOs that permit storage to participate in a capacity market.
However, NYISO permits an “Energy Limited Resource” to participate only if it can offer
capacity for a minimum of four hours. See NYISO, Installed Capacity Manual (February 2013), at
4.8.2, available at
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/market_data/icap/Manuals_and_Forms
/ICAP_Manual/icap_mnl.aspx. Requiring a minimum four-hour commitment prevents many
storage resources from accessing capacity payments, including all flywheels and many batteries.
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thus have no mechanism for recouping their total costs, a significant barrier for
any resource, but especially for emerging technologies with slim margins.204
D. Some Classification Problems
“[E]lectricity storage devices . . . do not readily fit into only one of the
traditional asset functions of generation, transmission or distribution. Under
certain circumstances, storage devices can resemble any of these functions or
even load.”205 However, the nature of the Commission’s jurisdiction often hinges
on the classification of a resource. Without an established policy for classifying
storage, or knowing how to maximize storage asset revenue and value streams,
regulatory uncertainty inhibits investment by market actors and regulated utilities
alike. To date, the Commission has been hesitant, only “address[ing] the
classification of energy storage devices on a case-by-case basis”.206
One issue is whether a storage device deployed on the bulk grid
constitutes a transmission or generation asset. In a matter of first impression, the
Commission had little difficulty granting “exempt wholesale generator” status to a
20MW battery system intended to provide frequency regulation at market-based
rates in NYISO’s competitive wholesale market.207 In classifying the project, the
Commission looked primarily to the applicant’s intended use—exclusively
providing ancillary services. 208 Indeed, from an operational perspective, the
“generation” bucket is perhaps the most comfortable fit for storage resources
intended to perform energy and ancillary service functions,209 especially in an
organized market.210
The Commission has also contemplated that storage resources might
constitute generation facilities in the context of two recent rulemakings. Most
recently, FERC issued a NOPR proposing changes to the Small Generator
Interconnection Agreements and Procedures (“SGIA” and “SGIP”), to among
other things, permit more small generators—particularly distributed solar PV—to
use the “Fast Track Process”, which reduces the cost, time, and regulatory burden
of interconnecting with utility grids.211 The NOPR states that Commission Staff
204

DOE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY STORAGE FOR GRID BALANCING AND
ARBITRAGE: PHASE 1, WECC, at xii (June 2012) (noting that storage will require additional
revenue streams such as capacity payments to be viable), available at
http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL21388_National_Assessment_Storage_Phase_1_final.pdf
205
W. Grid Dev., LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61056, at P44 (Jan. 21, 2010) (“Western Grid”).
206
Id.
207
AES ES Westover, LLC, 131 FERC ¶ 61008 (Apr. 5, 2010) (“We note that this is the first
instance in which the owner of a battery storage facility has sought EWG status.”).
208
Id. at P7 (“Applicant has represented that it will operate the *61044 Facility in such a
manner that it will be engaged directly and exclusively in selling electric energy at wholesale.”).
209
See, e.g., Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 95 FERC ¶ 61476 (June 29, 2001) (ruling that
energy exchange transactions for charging/discharging the first merchant CAES generator in the
United States were wholesale transactions under the FPA subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commission).
210
See AES ES Westover, LLC, 131 FERC ¶ 61008.
211
See Small Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procedures, 142 FERC ¶ 61049 (Jan.
17, 2013)
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plans to hold a technical conference, at which Staff and stakeholders will discuss
“[w]hether storage devices could fall within the definition of Small Generating
Facility included in . . . the SGIP . . . SGIA as devices that produce electricity”.212
The Commission appears inclined to target interconnection barriers to small
storage resources, while indicating an inclination to consider storage as a
generation resource in this context (i.e. “devices that produce electricity”).
Separately, the Commission also discussed the possible application to
storage of Order No. 764, which promotes the integration of variable energy
resources (“VERs”) by requiring each public utility transmission provider to offer
intra-hourly (fifteen-minute) transmission scheduling. 213 While primarily
intended to eliminate barriers to wind and solar resources,214 the Commission
emphasized that “many types of entities, not only VERs, may benefit from the
availability of intra-hour scheduling. . . . This includes, for example, . . .
transmission customers taking delivery from energy constrained resources (such
as flow-limited hydro-electric generators . . . and energy storage resources)”.215
Again, in the context of a rulemaking for certain types of generation resources,
the Commission indicated that energy storage might constitute a generation
resource benefited by the rule.
On the other hand, FERC seems less inclined to consider a storage device
as a transmission asset, particularly for the purposes of granting cost-of-service
rate treatment. Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, the Commission has found
that storage devices may constitute transmission facilities. FERC faced this
question in Western Grid Development, LLC, where a CAISO Participating
Transmission Owner (“PTO”)216 proposed a series of sodium sulfur batteries
ranging in size from 10MW to 50MW. The PTO stated the batteries would
“provide transmission services to solve existing reliability problems [on the
CAISO grid] at a lower cost than traditional transmission upgrades”. 217
Contingent on CAISO’s approval of the projects through its own transmission
planning process,218 and “based on the specific circumstances and characteristics”
of the proposal, the Commission found the projects were “wholesale transmission
facilities” subject to its jurisdiction.219 The Commission emphasized the storage
212

Id. at 48(e).
Integration of Variable Energy Res., 139 FERC ¶ 61246 (June 22, 2012).
214
“Implementation of intra-hour scheduling under this Final Rule will provide VERs and
other transmission customers the flexibility to adjust their transmission schedules, thus limiting
their exposure to imbalance charges.” Id.
215
Id. at P94.
216
A Participating Transmission Owner is a transmission owner who agrees to place its
facilities under the operational control of an ISO/RTO. The owner has no operational discretion
(though may retain actual control), but receives the regulated rates paid for transmission service by
customers.
217
Id. at P3-4. Western Grid claimed that the Projects would facilitate reliability on the
CAISO system by (1) mitigating normal transmission overload; (2) addressing transmission line
trips; (3) responding to transmission lines taken off for maintenance; and/or (4) reacting to voltage
dips on transmission line segments on the CAISO system.
218
Notably, CAISO strongly opposed the projects.
219
Id. at P43. The Commission, further emphasizing the exceptionality of its finding, stated:
“Western Grid has put forth a proposal that is unique thus far in terms of how it utilizes storage
213
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resources would function analogously to other transmission assets, such as
“capacitors that address voltage issues or alternate transmission circuits that
address line overloads or trips”.220 The Commission rejected the objection that
unlike capacitors, which are passive grid components, batteries are dispatchable
and thus, in effect, behave at times like generators.221 The Commission also
emphasized that Western Grid would not retain any incidental net revenue from
the purchase and sale of energy, thus distinguishing the projects from generation
assets used for providing energy or ancillary services.222 Finally, the Commission
emphasized that CAISO would exercise total operational control over the storage
devices, similar to normal transmission facilities. Ultimately, the Commission
hedged its decision as “unique”, but indicated an openness to classifying storage
resources based not on dogma, but rather a careful and open-minded consideration
of the project’s intended uses and capabilities.223
Earlier, the Commission refused to grant an advanced PSH project cost-ofservice recovery as a transmission facility, in what it called at the time an “issue[]
of first impression”.224 The applicant requested cost-of-service rate treatment for
a high-voltage transmission line and PSH project (the Lake Elsinore Advance
Pump Storage project (“LEAPS”)), which were intended to “help the [CAISO]
manage grid operations, shift off-peak energy closer to the demand center during
peak periods, and enhance the reliability of the Southern California transmission
grid while helping the State of California achieve its renewable resource use
goals”. 225 Importantly, the Commission agreed with Nevada Hydro that the
project, a PSH project, qualified as an “advanced transmission technology” under
the EPAct of 2005. 226 Going one step further, the Commission seemed to
interpret EPAct of 2005 as evidencing Congressional support for classifying
“advanced transmission technology” as FERC-jurisdictional transmission

technology to mimic a wholesale transmission function. In reaching this conclusion, we have
considered the specific way in which the Projects’ NaS batteries will be operated and Western
Grid's proposed cost recovery methodology. Our finding here that this particular project is
transmission is limited to the facts presented by Western Grid in this proceeding.”
220
Id. At 45.
221
Id.
222
Id. At 46.
223
Accord Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting & Fin. Reporting for New
Elec. Storage Technologies, 135 FERC ¶ 61240 (June 16, 2011) (“When faced with various
proposals to use energy storage technologies for jurisdictional purposes, the Commission has
analyzed the intended use and capability of storage proposals on a case-by-case basis.”).
224
See The Nevada Hydro Co., Inc., 117 FERC ¶ 61204 (Nov. 17, 2006) (“Nevada Hydro I”).
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Id.
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Id. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1223, 119 Stat. 594, 953 (2005).
Section 1223 states, “[i]n carrying out the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.) and the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.), the Commission shall
encourage, as appropriate, the deployment of advanced transmission technologies.” Section 1223
defines an advanced transmission technology as “a technology that increases the capacity,
efficiency, or reliability of an existing or new transmission facility,” including pumped hydro.
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assets.227 Nonetheless, the Commission refused to grant the project regulated cost
recovery through the CAISO’s transmission rates.
In Nevada Hydro, the Commission suggested a distinction between older
PSH technologies on the one hand, and smaller, more nimble advanced storage
technologies on the other hand. Among other concerns, the Commission noted
that all of the PSH within the CAISO footprint provide generation services, and
none receives the benefit of rolled-in transmission pricing.228 The Commission
concluded “that allowing LEAPS to receive a guaranteed revenue stream through
CAISO’s [transmission tarrif] would create an undue preference for LEAPS
compared to these other similarly situated pumped hydro generators.”229 In a
more recent issuance, the Commission noted that “[w]hile the Commission has no
basis to believe it is impossible to use large-scale pumped storage technologies to
perform transmission or distribution functions as well, to date, no pumped storage
developer has successfully demonstrated such a non-‘production’ use to the
Commission. This stands in contrast to the track record for smaller-scale energy
storage technologies, where one battery developer has successfully supported a
non-production, transmission use for its project.” 230 Thus, newer storage
technologies, which are bound by no comparable precedent, and smaller facilities,
which have less capability to behave like a generator and more capability to
perform flexible “non-‘production’” functions, may be more likely to receive
approval as FERC-jurisdictional transmission facilities subject to a cost-of-service
rate.
Perhaps equally important in Nevada Hydro, however, was the
Commission’s apparent discomfort with an ISO/RTO taking operational control
over a facility capable of behaving at times like a large (500MW) generator. As
in Western Grid, the applicant proposed to turn over operational control of the
project to CAISO.231 But the Commission, CAISO, and a number of interveners
objected that CAISO’s operational control over LEAPS, and in particular its
decisionmaking authority over when to charge and discharge the facility, would
compromise its independence from market participants (required under Order No.
2000), render the ISO a “de facto market participant”, and distort market prices.232
Nevada Hydro argued that every CAISO operational decision affects market
prices, including decisions to dispatch real power from Reliability Must-Run
(“RMR”) units.233 Indeed, because RMRs do not clear in the market, and are
dispatched and compensated directly by the ISO/RTO, an RMR is functionally a
generator under an ISO/RTO’s operational control. However, in Western Grid,
the Commission distinguished Nevada Hydro on the simple basis that Western
227

The Commission also found the proposed batteries in Western Grid to qualify as
“advanced transmission technologies”, but did not cite that finding in concluding the projects were
FERC-jurisdictional transmission facilities.
228
The Nevada Hydro Co., Inc., 122 FERC ¶ 61272 (Mar. 24, 2008) (“Nevada Hydro II”).
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See id.
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Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting & Fin. Reporting for New Elec.
Storage Technologies, 139 FERC ¶ 61245 (June 22, 2012) (citing Western Grid, supra note__).
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See Nevada Hydro II, supra note __.
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Grid would retain responsibility for maintaining the state of charge, including the
cost of charging, and it would return any net revenues to its customers.234 Thus,
in Western Grid (and as with RMRs), CAISO had no incentive to become a
profit-seeking market participant. But in Nevada Hydro, the Commission also
seemed intent on deferring to the outcome of a Commission-ordered CAISO
stakeholder process, which, on an “extensive record”, concluded that it would be
inappropriate for CAISO to take operational control of LEAPS.235 After Western
Grid and Nevada Hydro, it is ultimately unclear in what circumstances an
ISO/RTO may exercise operational control of a storage resource. ISO/RTOs
presented with the opportunity are unlikely to embrace it, and participating
transmission owners are unlikely to themselves propose a storage device in lieu of
traditional transmission infrastructure without further clarification.
The
236
Commission has provided little guidance.
In Western Grid, there was no question that the proposed storage projects
related to wholesale power and thus that their rates were within FERC’s
jurisdiction; the question was whether the storage devices at issue were
transmission or generation assets, a pivotal question in determining the
Commission’s jurisdiction and the available means of cost recovery. Another
unresolved issue is how to distinguish between transmission and distribution
facilities. An example might be CES functioning exclusively to provide
distribution-side power quality, voltage control, and emergency energy services.
In a jurisdiction with bundled retail rates, the state would have exclusive
jurisdiction over such resources and related rates, terms, and conditions of
service.237 In a jurisdiction with unbundled retail rates, however, the Commission
exercises jurisdiction over retail transmission facilities (and related rates, terms,
and conditions), but not purely local distribution facilities.238 The question is
thus whether CES resources performing distribution-side services constitute local
distribution facilities outside FERC’s jurisdiction. The Commission distinguishes
between retail distribution and transmission facilities with a seven-part test
established in Order No. 888. The seven indicia of local distribution facilities are
as follows.
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Western Grid, supra note __.
The Commission noted, “CAISO submits that, based on stakeholder input and its own
evaluation of the issues, recovery of the LEAPS facility through CAISO’s [transmission rate]
should not be permitted and CAISO should not assume operational control of the LEAPS facility,
other than its normal role with respect to the operation of generating units. Thus, CAISO
recommends market recovery for the LEAPS facility, pursuant to the Large Generator
Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) in the CAISO Tariff.” Nevada Hydro II, supra note __.
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See, e.g., Tres Amigas LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61207 (Mar. 18, 2010) (In approving a merchant
transmission line, the Commission emphasized that it was not approving related storage projects,
and noted uncertainty as to “whether any battery storage facilities are transmission assets subject
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See New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 26 (2002) (affirming FERC’s decision in Order No.
888 to not assert jurisdiction over the transmission of bundled retail services).
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See Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 695 (D.C. Cir.
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1. Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail
customers.
2. Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character.
3. Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever, flows
out.
4. When power enters a local distribution system, it is not reconsigned or
transported on to some other market.
5. Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a
comparatively restricted geographical area.
6. Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to
measure flows into the local distribution system.
7. Local distribution systems will be of reduced voltage.239
The Commission “will defer to recommendations by state regulatory authorities
concerning where to draw the jurisdictional line under [the seven-part test] for
local distribution facilities, and how to allocate costs for such facilities to be
included in rates”.240
Considering the Order No. 888 factors, the hypothesized CES facility fits
more comfortably on the local distributional side, beyond the Commission’s
jurisdiction. Certainly, the Commission would defer to a well-reasoned state
regulator’s determination that such CES were state-jurisdictional. But what if the
very same facilities, providing unbundled, local distribution services, also sold
ancillary services in an organized wholesale market?241 In that case, FERC would
exercise jurisdiction over the ancillary service sales, and the CES would, in effect,
become both a distribution and generation resource. But dividing the storage
device into different functional assets—one rate-regulated, the other rateunregulated; one state-regulated, the other FERC-regulated—raises a new set of
currently unresolved classification problems.
Combining Western Grid/Nevada Hydro and the above CES example, it is
apparent that not only might the Commission classify a given storage device as a
distribution, transmission, or generation asset, a storage device might properly be
classified as more than one. Legacy technologies do not pose the energy storage
classification conundrum, partly because they are operationally less flexible, and
partly because the classifications themselves arise from and are tailored to
traditional resources. But maximizing the value of a given storage asset within
the traditional generation-transmission-distribution framework may require
239

Order 888.
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See A123, Comments in AD10-13-000, at 11 (August 29, 2010) (“If placed at a
distribution site, the [CES] itself would meet some of the seven-factor criteria, including factors
(1) close proximity to retail customers, (2) primarily radial, and (7) relatively reduced voltage. The
voltage support service would satisfy the remaining four factors. However, the regulation service
would be inconsistent with factors (3) unidirectional flow, (4) energy not transported to another
market, (5) energy consumption in a restricted geographic area, and (6) meters used to measure
flows into the distribution system. In fact, the regulation capability would utilize bidirectional
flows, the energy would be readily transportable to another market for consumption, and the
meters would measure upstream flows to the transmission system.”)
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classifying it in more than one asset category. For example, a transmission utility
might deploy a 50MW battery as a transmission asset performing routine ancillary
grid functions, and recover its costs under a FERC-approved cost-of-service rate
stated in its OATT. But the utility might also deploy the battery to sell wholesale
energy at market-based rates during peak demand, perhaps shifting excess
renewable generation from off-peak hours. The problem posed is that the utility
would receive a guaranteed rate of return on the battery through its cost-of-service
transmission rate, and simultaneously receive market-based revenues from selling
wholesale energy. A different version of the same problem is implicated in the
CES example, above, where a distribution utility receives regulated retail rates
and simultaneously bids ancillary services into wholesale markets. In both
instances, because the storage device is subsidized by its guaranteed cost-ofservice rates, the utility could offer its services at below-market wholesale prices,
affording it an unfair advantage and distorting market signals. Likewise, if the
utility is also selling energy in an unbundled, competitive retail market, its
wholesale revenues could subsidize its retail rates and affect competition on the
retail level. In both instances, the device would over-recover its costs. The utility
would ultimately over-recover its costs by combining regulated and market-based
revenues.
FERC is rightly wary of such “cross-subsidization” or “double
recovery”,242 but has provided little guidance as to how an storage asset might
maximize its value through flexible, multifaceted deployment. The Commission
has permitted a single project or physical asset to receive revenues from both
regulated and market-based sources when the device was functionally divided by
ownership. For example, in Linden VFT, a developer installed new cooling
equipment to increase the thermal capacity of an existing regulated line by
300MW. 243 The Commission permitted Linden to operate the incremental
capacity as a merchant transmission project while the original capacity, under
separate ownership, remained under regulated rates.244 However, in Linden VFT,
the distinction between the old and new assets—i.e., that each rate type was
hooked onto a distinct set of assets—seemed critical. What about a single battery
system, the entire capacity of which is sometimes performing transmission
functions under a cost-of-service rate, and sometimes performing generation
functions at market-based rates? In this regard, FERC precedent provides only
limited guidance, leaving significant regulatory uncertainty and inhibiting storage
adoption by regulated transmission-owning entities.
Taking its first step toward resolving the classification problem in a
rulemaking context, the Commission recently issued a NOPR (bundled with the
NOPR discussed above) to revise the accounting and reporting requirements for
FERC-jurisdictional entities, to better account for and report transactions
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See Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Servs.; Accounting & Fin. Reporting for New Elec.
Storage Technologies, 135 FERC ¶ 61240 (June 16, 2011).
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Linden VFT, LLC, 119 FERC ¶ 61,066 (April 19, 2007), order on rehearing 120 FERC ¶
61,242 (September 20, 2007).
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associated with the use of energy storage devices in public utility operations.245
The NOPR recognizes that “entities using energy storage assets may seek
multiple methods of cost recovery for their investments in and use of a single
energy storage asset to provide various utility services”, and thus, in theory, “a
public utility could simultaneously recover costs under both cost-based and
market-based rates”. 246 To accommodate the multiple functions and value
streams of storage resources, and ensure “transparent information on the activities
and costs of new energy storage operations”, the Commission proposes relatively
simple revisions to its Uniform System of Accounts. In short, the Commission
proposes to add new storage-specific expense accounts to existing functional
classifications. 247 The Commission’s NOPR is much needed, and affords a
balance between transparency and flexibility, requiring public utilities to account
for storage-specific financial and operational information, while also affording
flexibility in classifying such costs. However, and importantly, the Commission
acknowledges the limited effect of the NOPR, when it states that the
“Commission’s accounting and reporting requirements . . . do not dictate the
ratemaking decisions of this Commission or State Commissions”; they are merely
intended to “support the rate oversight needs of both this Commission and State
Commissions”.248
In its recent NOPR, the Commission proposes useful revisions to its
accounting requirements, but punts on the question of how the Commission itself
will classify storage if and when it faces future cost-of-service, or yet more
difficult, hybrid cost-of-service/market-based rate proposals for storage resources.
The lack of clarity as to how a storage device might be categorized inhibits
regulated utilities from considering storage in making investment and planning
decisions. 249 Indeed, utilities are extremely conservative investors. Without
clarity—and with a guaranteed rate of return for doing business as usual—
transmission utilities have no incentive to consider new technologies laced with
regulatory uncertainties. The NOPR’s modest ambitions stand in sharp relief to
the comprehensive inquiries launched in the Request for Comments that initiated
the current NOPR.250 Perhaps the Commission continues to formulate next steps,
245

See Storage NOPR, supra note __.
Id. at P55, 67.
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Id. at P68. The Commission rejected the suggestion of some commenters to create an
entirely new and independent functional class for energy storage, reasoning that it “is unnecessary
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Id. at P70.
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recovery mechanisms.
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See Request for Comments Regarding Rates, Accounting and Financial Reporting for New
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but in the meantime, the Commission’s reluctance to resolve these questions, even
in the context of a generalized Request for Comments, is unfortunate, and leaves
significant barriers to energy storage in public utility transmission development.
E. Transmission Planning
Although significant uncertainty remains as to how the Commission will
classify any given storage deployment, the Commission has in certain
circumstances classified storage as a jurisdictional transmission facility. Indeed,
Congress has instructed the Commission that “[i]n carrying out the Federal Power
Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.) and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (16 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.), the Commission shall encourage, as appropriate,
the deployment of advanced transmission technologies”.251 “The term ‘advanced
transmission technology’ means a technology that increases the capacity,
efficiency, or reliability of an existing or new transmission facility, including-- . . .
(11) energy storage devices (including pumped hydro, compressed air,
superconducting magnetic energy storage, flywheels, and batteries)”. 252 In
Western Grid and Nevada Hydro, the Commission did not interpret EPAct of
2005 as requiring it to either (A) categorize storage as “transmission” assets, or
(B) “encourage” every storage proposal by approving storage transmission
projects in all circumstances. 253 The Commission rightly emphasized that
Congress gave it discretion to “encourage, as appropriate, the deployment” of
storage resources (and other advanced transmission technologies), and did not
foreclose classification of storage as non-transmission in appropriate
circumstances.254 Nonetheless, Congressional intent and FERC precedent suggest
that storage will increasingly be utilized as transmission facilities, thus raising
questions as to how it will fit into FERC’s transmission planning policies.
Partly implementing Congress’ mandate to encourage advanced
transmission technologies like storage, FERC has adopted incentive rates to
promote investment in certain transmission projects. EPAct of 2005, which added
a new section 219 to the FPA, instructs FERC to “provide a return on equity that
attracts new investment in transmission facilities (including related transmission
technologies); [and] (3) encourage deployment of transmission technologies and
other measures to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing transmission
facilities and improve the operation of the facilities.”255 The Commission has
implemented this mandate through Order No. 679.256 Order No. 679 established a
“nexus test”, which requires incentive applicants to demonstrate a connection
between the incentive(s) requested under Order No. 679 and the proposed
investment, and that the incentive(s) requested address the risks and challenges
251
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that a project faces. 257 In considering the use of advanced transmission
technologies, the Commission will, “as part of the overall nexus analysis,
account[] for the risks and challenges associated with utilizing such advanced
technology”.258
Order No. 679 appears to have influenced regulated transmission
investment.259 The year before Order No. 679 was promulgated, total regulated
transmission investment in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars totaled $6.5 billion; for
the years 2006-2010, annual investment averaged $9.3 billion, which amounts to
an increase of over 42 percent.260 Although uncommon, the Commission appears
willing to consider and approve (generous) incentives for storage resources
applying for regulated rates.261 Moreover, a major criticism of Order No. 679 is
that it has been too loosely implemented, offering incentives to too many
transmission projects.262 FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, for example, has
emphasized that incentives “should be more narrowly targeted to transmission
investments that provide incremental benefits, such as those that result from the
deployment of ‘best available technologies’ that increase operational and energy
efficiency, enhance grid operations, and result in greater grid flexibility”.263 As
the Commission tightens its Order No. 679-purse,264 it may be more likely to
focus incentives on advanced transmission technologies, including energy storage
projects.
FERC has also exercised significant influence over the way transmission
utilities plan transmission system development. In July 2011, FERC issued Order
No. 1000, the latest in a series of orders intended to improve federal transmission
access, planning, and coordination.265 FERC explained in Order No. 1000 that
257
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over the last few decades, and especially in recent years, federal and state policies
have significantly affected the generation mix and, subsequently, future
transmission needs—in particular, policies promoting development of renewable
generation. As FERC acknowledged, its existing orders regarding transmission
did not provide regional planners adequate direction as to how to consider these
reforms.266 Addressing these issues, Order No. 1000 affirmatively requires all
public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process
that satisfies the requirements set out in Order No. 890, and produce a regional
transmission plan.267 Among other requirements, the planning process must (1)
consider transmission needs driven by “public policy requirements”, and (2) give
non-transmission and transmission alternatives comparable consideration.268
FERC demurred when asked to cite specific “public policy requirements”
that must be considered, and on rehearing explained that planning must
incorporate currently enacted “state or federal laws or regulations that drive
transmission needs”.269 But the unspoken focus is state and federal policies,
primarily Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPSs”) and federal incentives, that
have fueled the development of renewable generation resources, especially wind
and solar.270 As we know, wind and solar are variable. But renewables are not
only temporally inconvenient; renewable resources (strong wind, bright sun) are
also usually located far from load centers and existing transmission
infrastructure.271 Thus, integrating the expanding fleet of renewable generation
that state and federal public policy requirements have encouraged will require
substantial new transmission infrastructure.272 As discussed above, storage can
perform a variety of transmission functions, including functions that facilitate
renewables integration. Moreover, energy storage is itself a public policy priority
in some regions, most notably California.273 However, Order No. 1000 does not
mention storage, and the Commission’s compliance orders to date do not indicate
any intention to require regional planning consider how storage resources might
no 890, in addition to requiring “non-generation” resources be permitted to provide ancillary
services in organized markets, improved transmission access rules and established “an open,
transparent, and coordinated transmission planning process.” Preventing Undue Discrimination
and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 Fed. Reg. 12266, ¶ 3 (Mar. 15, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241 (2007).
266
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Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public
Utilities, Order No. 1000-A ¶ 336, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184 (May 31, 2012), 139 FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 61,132, P319 (2012) (Order on Rehearing and Clarification).
270
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See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1811 (2012).
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address transmission-related public policy requirements, and/or require
consideration of storage as public policy priorities.274
A second important contribution of Order No. 1000 is to require
“comparable consideration” during the planning process of transmission and nontransmission alternatives for meeting identified regional transmission needs.275
By requiring this comparable treatment, Order No. 1000 recognizes the important
fact that even once a potential transmission need is identified, a new line is not
always the best way to meet that need. Such “non-wires” solutions may be at
once more cost-effective and more socially desirable. For example, demand
response and energy efficiency are possible non-transmission alternatives because
in some circumstances they may obviate the need for new transmission lines
altogether. 276 Likewise, storage performing ancillary services or alleviating
congestion could be a cost-effective and prudent alternative to new transmission
lines. But the Commission did not indicate in Order No. 1000, nor in any of the
compliance filings to date, any indication whether storage should be considered as
a non-transmission alternative, and none of the public utility filings have indicated
whether regional planning processes have considered storage as non-transmission
alternatives.
Thus, notwithstanding the bold promise of Order No. 1000, storage does
not appear to be a priority in regional transmission planning that the Commission
will require transmission planners to consider, whether as the solution to a
transmission need driven by public policy, or as a non-transmission alternative to
an identified transmission need.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FERC: COMPARABILITY AND CLARITY
In short, the problem of energy storage is one of regulatory adaptation to
technological change. Advanced storage is a disruptive technology, which not
only challenges basic market and industry paradigms, but also confounds
regulatory categories and market rules developed for legacy systems. FERC, as
regulator, must proactively ensure that markets adapt to new technologies. The
focus should not be on technologies per se, but rather operational characteristics.
Where an emerging technology performs a function differently than existing
274
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technologies, or where it performs an entirely novel type of function, regulatory
categories and market rules may underincentivize, inhibit, or entirely preclude its
adoption. Such barriers, rooted as they are in the historical characteristics of
legacy systems, are unduly discriminatory against new technologies. Moreover,
because antiquated rules prevent the efficiency gains afforded by new
technologies, wholesale rates are consequently neither just nor reasonable, and
consumer rates are higher than necessary. FERC should take the following
actions to ensure comparable consideration of storage alongside traditional
resources, and clarify the Commission’s approach to classifying storage assets.
A. Remedying Discrimination in the Provision of Ancillary Services
FERC has successfully remedied undue discrimination in organized
markets for frequency regulation, and should finalize its proposed rule for
ensuring that transmission utilities consider the speed and accuracy of regulation
resources in setting procurement requirements. 277 It must also finalize its
proposal to reform the Avista policy and thereby eliminate a categorical barrier to
third-party provision of ancillary services outside of ISO/RTOs.278 Finally, it
must ensure those orders are effectively implemented.
However, the
Commission’s decision to remedy undue discrimination in ancillary service
markets piecemeal has left intact the preferential treatment for incumbent
resources in the provision of other ancillary services. Perhaps justifiably, the
Commission has decided to progress with caution. But the very same principles
that animate its orders relating to frequency regulation are equally applicable to
primary and tertiary frequency control and other reserve products—eventually,
the Commission must address remaining barriers to energy storage in the
provision of other ancillary services.
Primary frequency control reserve is provided by all resources with
autonomous governor response that are synchronized (and have the headroom to
increase generation), but none of the ISO/RTOs procure frequency response
through organized markets. FERC has not historically required the creation of
organized wholesale markets for wholesale products, but rather has ensured that
once established, such markets are governed by just, reasonable,
nondiscriminatory rules. As the amount of power provided by variable renewable
generation increases, the fraction of on-line generation capacity offering primary
frequency control will decrease—in the future, market mechanisms may be
necessary to ensure sufﬁcient provision of primary frequency control reserve.279
Regardless of whether FERC should mandate the creation of frequency response
markets, or whether the ISO/RTOs independently conclude that such markets are
necessary, FERC must ensure that rules for the provision of frequency response
are not unduly discriminatory or preferential if and when such markets are
created. Likewise, if and when primary frequency response becomes an
277
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2012), available at http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.pdf.
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unbundled service outside of ISO/RTOs, the Commission must ensure that
procurement targets and compensation practices account for actual performance,
to ensure just and reasonable treatment of storage resources.
Perhaps more immediately, FERC must remedy undue discrimination in
the provision of spinning and non-spinning reserves. Once discharging,
conventional generators and storage resources have comparable operational
characteristics in providing tertiary frequency control. However, the spinning and
non-spinning reserve products in ISO/RTOs do not reward, or even consider the
possibility of, a resource capable of ramping to a substantial output within instants
of system need. Quite simply, current market rules are tailored to the operational
characteristics of traditional resources. The rules assume that quick reserve
resources will take ten minutes to ramp up, and thus do not incentivize or reward
resources capable of substantially quicker response and ramp times.
Ultimately, new reserve rules—for all ancillary services—should
eliminate arbitrary deﬁnitions of reserve categories common in current market
designs, which reference the operational characteristics of the technologies
thought best able to provide that category of reserves. 280 Instead, market
categories and rules should signal system needs—such as response time and
location, ramp rate, and duration of service delivery—and reward resources
capable of best satisfying those needs, regardless of technology. Rules based on
system needs rather than incumbent technological characteristics will ensure that
resources are compensated on terms that are not unduly discriminatory or
preferential. And the increased competition in the provision of ancillary services
will enhance market efficiency and ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates.
Ancillary service provision will become more cost-effective, while many
traditional generators will be freed to do what they do best: generate energy.
B. Incorporating Storage into Resource Adequacy Mechanisms
FERC must amend its regulations under the FPA to ensure that qualified
storage resources will be considered equally alongside conventional generation
and demand-side resources in capacity markets and resource adequacy planning.
Certain storage technologies can perform functions comparable to resources that
participate in capacity markets, while increasing system reliability and efficiency,
and mitigating the system’s environmental impact. Requiring ISO/RTOs to
consider storage as a capacity resource will enhance the competitiveness of
organized wholesale markets and remove barriers to the participation of energy
storage resources, thus ensuring just and reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory or preferential wholesale rates.
Resource adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply and
deliver the total quantity of electricity demanded at any given time taking into
account scheduled and unscheduled outages of system elements. In practice,
resource adequacy requirements focus on procuring capacity to satisfy peak load
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See id. at 33.
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events.281 The ISO/RTOs set capacity procurement targets to satisfy NERC’s
“one day in ten year” standard, under which system planners should ensure
adequate capacity such that, under a probabilistic analysis, demand will exceed
available capacity no more than once every ten years. 282 Thus, taking into
consideration locational differences and related energy security needs, the primary
resource adequacy consideration is simple: whether anticipated peak summer and
winter capacity exceed, by a safe margin, the forecast peak summer and winter
load.283 If not, then the ISO/RTO will adjust the administrative capacity market
demand curve, and/or increase the capacity procurement targets for the
responsible utility or LSE, expressed simply in MWs of capacity.284
Because resource adequacy focuses on the bulk power system’s ability to
satisfy peak demand, and storage devices are capable of functioning as peaking
resources, storage should qualify as capacity resources in capacity markets and
resource adequacy requirements. Indeed, perhaps because of its long history,
PSH is permitted to participate in some capacity markets, but other storage
resources with comparable operational characteristics are not. Unequal treatment
for resources capable of comparable performance is a hallmark of a
discriminatory rule in wholesale electricity markets. For example, FERC recently
mandated that ISO/RTOs permit demand response 285 resources to participate,
under certain conditions, in organized wholesale energy, capacity, and ancillary
service markets on comparable terms with conventional generation-side
resources. 286 FERC’s reasoning was simple: if a demand-side resource is
281

See, e.g., James F. Wilson, Reconsidering Resource Adequacy-Part 1, Pub. Util. Fort.,
April 1 2010, at 33. (“Electric utilities and regional transmission organizations (RTOs) in the
United States aim to have enough electric generating capacity to meet anticipated peak loads with
a reserve margin for reliability.”)
282
See Planning Resource Adequacy Analysis, Assessment and Documentation, NERC
Standard BAL-502-RFC-02, available at http://www.nerc.com/files/BAL-502-RFC-02.pdf.
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See, e.g., NYISO 2012 Reliability Needs Assessment (September 18, 2012), at C-1 (“In
order to perform the 2012 [Resource Needs Assessment], a forecast of summer and winter peak
demands and annual energy requirements was produced for the years 2013 - 2022.”), available at
http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/services/planning/Planning_Studies/Re
liability_Planning_Studies/Reliability_Assessment_Documents/2012_RNA_Final_Report_9-1812_PDF.pdf.
284
The demand curve in capacity markets is administratively determined based on the
resource adequacy planning analysis.
285
Demand response is a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by customers from
their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive
payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy. See O
286
In Order No. 719, the Commission required ISO/RTOs to accept bids from demand
response resources in markets for certain ancillary services on a basis comparable to other
resources. To qualify, demand response resources must: (1) be technically capable of providing
the ancillary service and meet the necessary technical requirements; and (2) submit a bid under the
generally-applicable bidding rules at or below the market-clearing price, unless the laws or
regulations of the relevant electric retail regulatory authority do not permit a retail customer to
participate. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719,
73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008), order on reh’g, Order
No. 719-A, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, at P47 (2009). The order applies “to competitively-bid markets,
if any, for energy imbalance, spinning reserves, supplemental reserves, reactive supply and voltage
control, and regulation and frequency response”. Id. at P49. More recently, in Order 745, the
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operationally comparable to a supply-side resource (in providing energy, capacity,
or ancillary services), the resources should participate and be compensated
comparably.287 The Commission’s reasoning is apt here: storage resources are
comparable to conventional generation and demand-side resources, in that each
can function as a capacity resource capable of meeting peak capacity needs, and
thus storage should be permitted to participate in capacity markets on comparable
terms.
Focusing on demand response resources in capacity markets is illustrative.
The ISO/RTOs have developed rules for permitting demand response resources,
many of which are duration-limited, to participate in capacity markets. For
example, PJM permits “Limited Demand Resources” to participate in its
Reliability Pricing Model. 288 Such resources must commit to at least ten
interruptions of demand during a given commitment period, with a minimum
capable duration of six hours each.289 Remarkably, PJM does not permit storage
resources with comparable capabilities to participate in its capacity market, e.g. a
storage device capable of six hours of discharge at some specified capacity. This
contradiction is magnified considering that storage resources can participate in
PJM’s capacity market so long as they bid as demand response resources. For
example, if storage were deployed behind the meter, and utilized by a load during
peak hours to reduce the load’s effective demand on the grid, the storage device
could be used as the basis for a Limited Demand Response capacity resource in
PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model. That a storage device would qualify as a
capacity resource if presented as a demand resource, but not if presented as
supply-side capacity, further indicates that the operational characteristics of
certain storage resources are consistent with capacity resources and should be
Commission required each RTO and ISO in which demand response participates in its energy
market to pay a demand response resource the market price for energy, also referred to as the
locational marginal price (“LMP”), when two conditions are met. First, the demand response
resource must have the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation
resource. Second, dispatch of the demand response resource must be cost-effective as determined
by a net benefits test. The “net benefits” condition is intended to address what is known as the
“billing unit effect” of dispatching demand response. By decreasing load, demand response
decreases the LMP. However, by decreasing load, demand response also decreases the number of
billing units over which utilities recover their costs. Accordingly dispatching demand response
may result in an increased cost per billing unit ($/MWh) to the remaining wholesale load. See
Demand Response Comp. in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶
61187 (Mar. 15, 2011).
287
See id. at P119 (“This Final Rule addresses the need for organized wholesale energy
markets to provide compensation to demand response resources on a comparable basis to supplyside resources when demand response resources are comparable to supply-side resources, so that
both supply and demand can meaningfully participate.”).
288
Under an earlier PJM tariff, the RTO established only one demand response category,
defined identically to Limited Demand Response. In December of 2010, it sought permission to
amend its tariff to include two additional demand response products, both of which would be
available an unlimited number of times each year, during the entire year, for minimum durations
of ten hours each interruption. See Demand Resource Products Alternative Order, 134 FERC ¶
61,066.
289
See PJM Reliability Assurance Agreement, Section 1.43A (January 4, 2013), available at
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/agreements/raa.ashx.
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considered alongside generation and demand-side resources in resource adequacy
planning.
FERC has explicitly required the ISO/RTOs to permit behind-the-meter
generation to qualify as a demand response resource capable of participating in
capacity markets. Order No. 719 states that “the Commission has not excluded
from eligibility any type of resource that is technically capable of providing [an]
ancillary service, including a load serving entity’s . . . or eligible retail customer’s
behind-the-meter generation . . . resource.”290 Likewise, in an Order No. 745
compliance filing, FERC required MISO to amend its proposed demand response
resource categories to clarify that each category would include “Behind the Meter
Generation”. 291 FERC’s interpretation of its demand response orders is
appropriate: behind-the-meter generation and other distributed resources can be
dispatched to reduce effective load or provide ancillary services in a manner
indistinguishable—from a grid-operational perspective—from an actual reduction
or adjustment in consumption. Taking one-step further, FERC should require
comparable treatment of energy storage performing as capacity, in addition to
storage performing—with identical operational characteristics—as durationlimited demand response.
While bidding as a demand response resource is a backdoor into capacity
markets, it is insufficient. Market rules for demand response resources are
tailored to load-side curtailment, and would impose arbitrary and unnecessary
limits on storage opportunities. For example, if distributed storage resources are
categorized as demand response to bid into capacity markets, but also seek to
participate in energy markets, they will be limited by the net benefits test.292 But
unlike demand response resources, distributed storage could behave as
dispatchable distributed generation.293 When selling wholesale power to the grid,
storage would not trigger the billing unit effect because the number of billing
units over which utilities recover their costs would not decrease; indeed, it would
increase. Similarly, to perform as a demand response resource, storage must be
distributed on the distribution-side of the grid, whether on the community level or
at a load site. But storage resources are capable of a variety of other modes of
deployment. Quite simply, the demand response market rules do not fit all of the
operational characteristics and opportunities of storage resources, and thus the
demand-response backdoor is an incomplete means for storage to access capacity
payments.
One must, however, acknowledge that energy storage differs
fundamentally from other capacity resources, particularly traditional generators,
energy efficiency, and duration-unlimited demand response. Those resources
contribute to the long-term, indefinite balance of supply and demand, while
storage, which is duration- and energy-limited, can only contribute to short-term,
290
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See Order 719, supra note __, at P56.
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 137 FERC ¶ 61214, at P41 (Dec. 15,

2011).
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See supra note ___, discussing Order 745 and the “net benefits test”.
The dispatchability of a charged energy storage resource distinguishes it from other forms
of distributed generation, namely solar PV, which is non-dispatchable.
293
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marginal balancing. In an age before variable renewable resources, traditional
generators were capable of providing both firm capacity—i.e. resources to meet
(and exceed) peak demand—and flexibility necessary to ensure system quality—
i.e. through ancillary services.294 Ensuring system quality requires not only raw
MWs of capacity, but particular operational characteristics, such as quick and
accurate response and fast-ramping. With the increasing penetration of variable
generation, traditional resources will no longer be adequate for ensuring the
moment-to-moment, marginal balance of supply and demand.295 Fast, accurate,
and flexible resources, including many storage technologies, will become critical
to ensuring system quality in the near future. 296 Thus, system quality and
resource flexibility has become not merely an operational concern for which grid
operators must dispatch resources in real-time, but also an investment
consideration for which operators should plan in advance through resource
adequacy processes. But storage resources do not fit neatly into a planning
framework based on simpleMW of capacity. Understandably, to include storage
as “capacity” without qualification is uncomfortable within a long-term planning
framework. But capacity markets and resource adequacy requirements that only
consider duration- and energy-unlimited resources (with the contradictory
exception of limited demand response) will underincentivize and thus forego the
possible efficiency, reliability, and environmental gains of deploying grid storage.
This discussion illustrates that for meeting peak capacity requirements and
ensuring system quality there is no basis for excluding storage from resource
adequacy planning, but because it is duration- and energy-limited, storage should
perhaps be addressed through an independent planning mechanism. For the sake
of discussion, let’s call one option “Energy Storage Capacity” (“ESC”). 297
Establishing an ESC product is preferable to requiring that storage participate as a
conventional capacity resource because ISO/RTOs could assess through the
resource adequacy planning process an independent target for ESC, considering
the unique operational characteristics of storage resources—e.g., flexible, fastramping, up and down regulation, energy- and duration-limited—in light of
system needs. Indeed, in requiring the ISO/RTOs to permit demand response in
capacity markets, FERC approved the creation of independent demand response
capacity categories.298 Moreover, FERC approved PJM’s proposal to distinguish
between and set independent procurement targets for “annual resources”
(generation, unlimited demand response, and energy efficiency) and “limited
resources” (limited demand response).299 By setting independent ESC targets,
ISO/RTOs would be able to manage and incentivize ESC resources to meet peak
load capacity and ensure system quality with the superior flexibility of storage
resources. At the same time, the ISO/RTOs would be able to set independent
294

See Hogan et al., Regulatory Assistance Project, What Lies “Beyond Capacity Markets”?
Delivering Least-Cost Reliability Under the New Resource Paradigm, at 3 (August 14, 2012),
available at http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6041.
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See generally KEMA, supra note __.
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See id.
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CPUC has effectively instituted this policy. See D. 13-02-015, adopted February 23, 2013.
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See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 134 FERC ¶ 61066 (Jan. 31, 2011).
299
See id. at 29.
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capacity targets to incentivize firm capacity resources necessary to ensure longterm resource adequacy, such as unlimited demand response, energy efficiency,
and generation.300 By planning for an optimal resource mix that includes flexible
storage resources, ISO/RTOs could ensure reliability while integrating
renewables, avoid unnecessary capital investment, and ultimately deliver power at
lower cost.
The current definition of resource adequacy—which one-dimensionally
values quantities of capacity, without regard to operational qualities, particularly
flexibility—must be reformed. One option, described above, is to create a
separate ESC capacity product. Another option for ISO/RTOs might be a
mechanism that distinguishes between firm capacity on the one hand, and—more
broadly than ESC—“Flexible Capacity” (“FC”) on the other. An FC product
would be defined not by technology type per se, but rather by operational system
needs. FC would include energy- and duration-limited resources like storage, in
addition to flexible traditional generators. The need for FC will continue to grow
as the penetration of variable resources increases and net load becomes more
volatile.301 But existing capacity markets do not properly account for the varying
operational characteristics of different resources. FERC has remedied undue
discrimination in the frequency regulation markets, but without a mechanism for
recouping fixed costs, resources capable of providing the flexibility necessary for
the integration of renewables will not be adequately incentivized. Meanwhile,
natural events capable of temporarily compromising the bulk power system have
and will continue to become more frequent with climate change, but the
traditional one-dimensional resource adequacy paradigm fails to account for
resources like storage capable of providing resiliency in the event of a significant
emergency or contingency. Thus, FERC might consider requiring the ISO/RTOs
to study whether it would be beneficial to create an FC resource adequacy
product, to ensure the adequacy of flexible resources necessary to satisfy future
system needs.
300

Including energy storage within the general capacity resource category could also
incentivize installation of storage beyond optimal levels. The marginal utility of energy storage
may decrease as it forms a greater part of the capacity mix because, ultimately, storage does not
generate energy. But the general capacity mechanism would not provide corresponding price
signals because storage would be incentivized equally alongside traditional generation resources.
At some point, hypothetically, storage capacity would cause increasing operational costs and
ultimately exceed the capacity of generation resources available to charge storage during off-peak
hours. This note is intended merely to serve as a conceptual illustration of how storage may have
diminishing marginal utility: the day, if ever, that storage forms such a substantial portion of
capacity is far off indeed. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61130, at P12 (May 17,
2012) (proposing a benefits factor in implementing Order No. 755, “because there are decreasing
marginal benefits from each additional MW” of frequency regulation from storage).
301
The CPUC is currently considering a flexible capacity procurement requirement, to serve
precisely this function. See CPUC, Briefing Paper: A Review of Current Issues with LongTerm
Resource Adequacy, at 25 (February 20, 2013) (noting that “some demand response and energy
storage resources are[] fast responding, and may be able to provide a significant amount of
flexibility for the grid”), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/E2A36B6A-977E4130-A83F61E66C5FD059/0/CPUCBriefingPaperonLongTermResourceAdequacyBriefingPaperFebrua.pdf.
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Ultimately, it is beyond the scope of this Article to argue how the
ISO/RTOs should accommodate energy storage in resource adequacy planning.302
But it is clear that FERC must remedy unduly discriminatory barriers to storage in
organized wholesale markets, where traditional resources enjoy preferential
capacity mechanisms. In Order No. 1000, FERC recognized the need to give
“comparable consideration” to transmission and non-transmission alternatives.303
It is time to require the analogue in resource adequacy planning and capacity
markets. Storage with operational characteristics comparable (and often superior)
to traditional generators and demand response must be considered comparably in
capacity markets and resource adequacy planning.
C. Some Classification Considerations
Advanced storage technologies are amorphous. They provide multiple
grid benefits and exhibit operational characteristics that cut across existing
regulatory and jurisdictional boundaries. As discussed above, FERC has
cautiously approached the classification of storage devices on a case-by-case
basis. It is time for the Commission to clarify—through a policy statement or
rulemaking—the factors it will consider in (1) classifying storage resources, (2)
determining whether and how a storage device may avail itself of multiple types
of revenue streams, and (3) establishing mechanisms necessary to prevent crosssubsidization and over-recovery. In doing so, FERC must afford regulatory
flexibility. To bind new and more nimble resources to rules tailored to the rigid
operational characteristics of legacy technologies is arbitrary, and will inhibit
more efficient wholesale markets and result in unjust and unreasonable rates.
First, the threshold classification question: should energy storage be fit
into existing regulatory categories (generation, transmission, and/or distribution),
or should a stand-alone storage functional classification be created? While
attractive on its face, the latter option of creating a stand-alone storage category
does not resolve deeper substantive questions. An independent storage category
would superficially consolidate accounting for storage costs and assets, and
perhaps make accounting and cost-of-service rate setting more convenient.304 But
for instance, it’s not clear how a stand-alone storage product would enhance the
operation of organized wholesale markets. On the one hand, storage resources
302

For one proposal of how to ensure adequate flexible capacity, see Hogan et al., Regulatory
Assistance Project, What Lies “Beyond Capacity Markets”? Delivering Least-Cost Reliability
Under the New Resource Paradigm (August 14, 2012), available at
http://www.raponline.org/document/download/id/6041.
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See Order No. 1000, supra note __, at P155. Cf. Order No. 890 (“non-generation
resources” must be considered comparably alongside generation resources in ancillary service
markets).
304
It is important that storage receive independent consideration in the Commission’s
accounting protocols. I don’t, however, consider it important how. For instance, the recent NOPR
proposes to add various expense accounts for storage to each of the existing functional
classifications. This has the virtue of being flexible, affording operators significant leeway in
deploying and accounting for storage costs and assets. On the other hand, a consolidated energy
storage functional classification might superficially make it easier to manage storage-related
financial and operational data. On this point, I’m agnostic, but ultimately do not consider it as
important as the substantive issues discussed herein.
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perform a variety of critical grid functions better than traditional generators. But
ensuring that compensation practices account for speed and accuracy will level
the playing field for storage resources in those existing markets—both inside and
outside regions with ISO/RTOs.
The only stand-alone storage service that does not fit neatly into an
existing regulatory product is a time-shifting service. For example, a storage unit
might bid into an organized market for storing energy at a per-MWh cost, plus a
duration cost. The most likely time-shifting customer would be a generator
storing off-peak energy for retrieval during peak hours. A transmission utility
could likewise offer a time-shifting service under regulated rates as an openaccess transmission service, to transfer energy through time just as traditional
transmission services transfer energy through space. In that case, however,
storage might simply be categorized as a transmission service, as it is in the
natural gas context.305 And as with natural gas storage, independent storage
operators might offer time-shifting storage services as negotiated rates to
transmission utilities and generators.306 Aside from this particular stand-alone
product, the question of a “stand-alone” storage classification seems superficial.
Moreover, FERC declined to create an independent storage asset category in its
recent NOPR, and most commentators supported that decision.307
The classification question does, however, matter for determining whether
and how storage fits into certain planning and procedural rules. For instance, if a
storage facility is considered generation, then it might seek interconnection under
the SGIP/SGIA or LGIP/LGIA, but if a storage is considered transmission, then it
would have to comply with transmission-related interconnection requirements.
Likewise, planning requirements differ. If a storage device is considered
generation, then it should be able to participate in resource adequacy planning and
capacity markets, and if the storage device is considered transmission, then it
should be considered through transmission planning under Orders Nos. 890 and
1000. If FERC were to create an entirely new asset category, then all of these
practical questions would also need resolution. But because each of the particular
operational characteristics can be comfortably accommodated in existing
categories, with their attendant procedures and requirements, the costs and
uncertainty of creating a new category may exceed the benefits. The
complication, of course, is that while each operational characteristic in isolation
fits into existing categories, the total operational characteristics of a given storage
device exceed any given category.
305

See Re Pipeline Serv. Obligations, Order No. 636, 59 FERC ¶ 61030 (Apr. 8, 1992).
Modifying the Avista policy will ease the provision of market-based services to
transmission utilities. For an explanation of natural gas storage, see EIA, U.S. Underground
Natural Gas Storage Developments: 1998-2005 (October 2006), available at
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngstorage/ngstorage.pdf. If a
time-shifting product were created, the question does remain how to functionally classify it. The
question is not just academic. If it were a merchant transmission facility, for example, then it
would be FERC-jurisdictional and might be eligible for incentives, but would have to go through a
cumbersome transmission planning process. On the other hand, if it were generation then it would
be easier to interconnect, but the facility itself would not be subject to FERC jurisdiction.
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See Storage NOPR, supra note __.
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Accordingly, the second and more difficult issue is whether, and if so
how, the Commission should permit a given storage device to perform multiple
grid functions and access multiple value streams, while preventing crosssubsidization or over-recovery. Studies have recognized that storage resources
are already cost-competitive resources, so long as they are permitted to access
multiple value streams and benefit the grid in a variety of ways.308 This problem
does not arise where a merchant energy-storage provider owns and operates a
storage device, selling services in a wholesale market and/or through a bilateral
contract with a transmission utility. But take, for example, a large battery
deployed by a regulated transmission utility, for frequency regulation and voltage
control. The utility expects the battery will primarily perform such ancillary grid
functions, and seeks regulated-rate recovery for the device. However, during the
peak days of summer, the utility intends to sell energy from the batteries to LSEs
downstream at negotiated rates. The precise classification of the battery is less
relevant than the policy for integrating cost-based and market-based recovery
mechanisms for a single physical asset. In answering this question, the
Commission must be nimble, and without enough experience, it would premature
to establish any policies that impose prior restrictions on innovation in the
deployment of storage resources. An ideal policy would ensure that energy
storage resources are not arbitrarily restricted from maximally benefiting the grid
and accessing multiple revenue streams.
One non-arbitrary restriction would protect against over-recovery, which
distorts markets, and cross-subsidization of one customer-base by another, which
raises consumer fairness concerns. One option is asset partitioning. The utility
could receive cost-of-service transmission for some pro rata share of batteryrelated costs, and pursue market-based rates with the portion of battery resources
not devoted to transmission. However, the logistics of designing and policing the
rates for a partitioned storage device are problematic. FERC has approved
multiple rates for a single device based on partitioned assets, but in those cases,
no single asset performed a function under more than one rate.309 The battery in
our hypothetical, however, would at times be devoted to transmission services,
and at other times energy service, making FERC precedent an awkward fit. And
attempting to apportion the device before the fact might not correspond with
actual revenues, and thus could result in cross-subsidization or over-recovery.
A better option, based on actual rather than projected revenues, might be
to include the entire battery in the utility’s transmission rate-base. Then permit
market-based transactions for energy as well, but revenue from the market-based
transactions would then flow back to reduce the regulated rates charged to
transmission customers, with a portion retained by the utility as incentive to
maximize market revenues. But FERC would have to ensure that the utility does
308

See DOE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY STORAGE FOR GRID BALANCING AND
ARBITRAGE: PHASE 1, WECC, at xii (June 2012) (noting that storage will require additional
revenue streams such as capacity payments to be viable), available at
http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL21388_National_Assessment_Storage_Phase_1_final.pdf.
309
See Linden VFT, supra note __, and accompanying text.
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not distort market prices by bidding lower than other, non-subsidized market
participants. For example, the utility could be a price taker, only able to accept
the LMP but not able to bid into the market.310 FERC might also establish a rule
permitting the storage device to engage in market-based transactions only where
the storage device’s transmission services are not required to satisfy reliability
requirements, thereby prioritizing reliability over profit-seeking. This model of
permitting incremental market transactions from an otherwise rate-regulated asset
also fits better into FERC precedent. The Commission has authorized utilities to
sell excess capacity and energy from rate-based generation; authorizing the
market-based sale of energy from rate-based storage seems indistinguishable.311
A related wrinkle is how the Commission should permit a given storage
device to perform both distribution-side (i.e. non-jurisdictional) and transmissionside or wholesale generation-side (i.e. jurisdictional) functions simultaneously,
while avoiding cross-subsidization or over-recovery. The problem posed is in
many regards identical to the problem of multiple value streams discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, but here the device and/or its activities are partially outside
the Commission’s jurisdiction.312 The divided jurisdiction makes the solution
proposed above (offsetting regulated rates with market-based revenues)
impracticable because the cost-of-service rates are set by state regulators. This
puzzle implicates federalist concerns and practical barriers more complicated than
simple divided rate recovery. But the question is critical: distributed storage is
considered among the most promising modes of grid deployment. 313 While
largely within the states’ jurisdiction, the Commission’s policies will also affect
distributed deployment, by permitting or inhibiting additional revenue streams
and grid benefits. It is crucial that FERC initiate a proceeding to clarify through a
collaborative stakeholder process—including local and state regulators—how
distributed energy storage might participate in FERC-jurisdictional activities.
A final issue among classification problems is in what circumstances an
ISO/RTO should be permitted to operate a storage device, while maintaining
independence and not unduly affecting market competition. Under Orders Nos.
888 and 2000, ISO/RTOs must maintain independence from market participants
to ensure healthy competition and undistorted market signals.314 If an ISO/RTO
310

This is how demand response participates in energy markets under Order No. 745. See
Order No. 745, supra note __.
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[CESA comments on Storage NOPR].
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See supra section II.D., discussing the CES example.
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Five of DOE’s sixteen ARRA-funded storage pilots are distributed storage projects. See
EAC 2012, supra note __, at 31. See also CEC 2020, supra note __, at 167-78.
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Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, [Regs. Preambles 1996-2000]
F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. P 31,089, at p. 30,995 (2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 809 (2000) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 35), order on reh’g, Order No. 2000-A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. P 31,092, 65 Fed.
Reg 12,088 (2000), aff’d sub nom., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, [Regs. Preambles 1991-1996] F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. P 31,036 (1996), 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540 (1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385), order on reh'g, Order No. 888A, F.E.R.C. Stats. & Regs. P 31,048 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 81 F.E.R.C. P
61,248, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 F.E.R.C. P 61,046
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were to have a stake in market outcomes, and were thus a profit-seeking entity, its
role as impartial grid operator and market manager would be compromised. The
Commission indicated in Nevada Hydro that permitting an ISO/RTO to operate a
PSH facility might compromise its independence because the ISO would have to
buy energy from the market to charge and discharge the facility and would be
incentivized to consider energy prices.315 In Western Grid—where an applicant
proposed batteries as transmission assets to be operated by CAISO—the
Commission distinguished Nevada Hydro on the grounds that CAISO would not
manage the storage devices’ charge and would not retain any net revenues from
buying or selling energy.316 Thus, at a minimum, it seems that for an ISO/RTO to
manage a storage device as a transmission asset, the ISO/RTO must be indifferent
to energy prices in deciding when to charge or discharge the device. One option
is the Western Grid mechanism, where a third-party manages charge and
revenues, and any net revenues are credited to regulated-rate.317 Another might
be to functionally separate storage-related operations within an ISO/RTO, such
that storage operators are screened from real-time energy price information, with
any net revenues credited or charged to customers. One might object that, with
either mechanism, the ISO/RTO would still have an undue ability to affect market
prices. However, while an ISO/RTO’s control of storage resources could affect
market prices, its operational control over any transmission facility impacts
related markets. The ISO’s/RTO’s ability to affect prices using a storage device
is conceptually and practically indistinguishable from any decision relating to the
construction or operation of a new transmission wire, tower, substation,
transformer, switch, or other facility, so long as the decision is indifferent to (and
perhaps entirely ignorant of) market prices.
Ultimately, this Article has merely charted some of the thornier questions
faced by FERC and stakeholders. How the Commission resolves these questions
must be determined through a notice and comment process involving all relevant
stakeholders. That these questions are ripe for resolution, however, is beyond
question.
D. Incorporating Energy Storage into Transmission Planning
Under Order No. 1000, FERC should ensure comparable consideration of
storage alongside traditional transmission infrastructure as a solution to meeting
public policy-driven transmission needs, and as a transmission or nontransmission alternative to traditional infrastructure in satisfying identified
transmission needs.
Order No. 1000’s mandate to consider “public policy requirements” most
obviously informs regional transmission-line planning necessary to link new
renewable generation to load. While a storage resource cannot connect a distant
wind farm to a load center, it can help integrate variable renewable resources
(1998), aff'd in relevant part sub nom., Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225
F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
315
See supra, section II.D.
316
See id.
317
See id.
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driven by public policy requirements. Deployed to smooth output or provide
frequency control on lines with high-levels of variable resources, storage could be
an effective transmission solution to a public policy-driven transmission need, as
an alternative to new transmission line interconnections. 318 Moreover,
transmission planning must consider public policy-driven transmission needs
other than those related to renewables. Energy storage is itself a public policy
requirement in some places, most notably California.319 Thus, to the extent that
storage is a cost-effective or otherwise prudent solution to resolving a
transmission issue, in a state like CA with an energy storage policy requirement, it
should be preferred to traditional transmission line infrastructure.320
Storage resources could also be considered “non-transmission”
alternatives and should thus be considered comparably alongside traditional lines
in transmission planning. Properly deployed, storage can resolve identified
transmission needs comparably to traditional lines, for example, by alleviating
congestion and servicing remote load centers. A refrain throughout this Article is
that storage resources must be considered comparably alongside legacy
technologies performing comparable functions; Order No. 1000 makes this
mandate clear in the context of transmission planning.
While Order No. 1000 seems to mandate comparable consideration of
storage resources in transmission planning, other practical considerations may
make it yet more appealing than traditional lines. As is widely recognized, local
and state incentives are not aligned with regional transmission needs, yet state and
local governments retain exclusive jurisdiction over the siting and permitting of
new transmission lines. 321 Meanwhile, FERC has only extremely limited
“backstop” authority to override state or local resistance to a proposed interstate
transmission project.322 This “federalism mismatch”, which permits parochial
interests to veto projects of regional and national concern, has stymied interstate
transmission-line development critical for regional reliability and renewables
integration.323 Because storage devices are self-contained, intra-state facilities
only subject to the jurisdiction of one state, storage may be a solution to the
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319
320

Relatedly, some commenters have persuasively argued that local, state, and federal
demand response and energy efficiency initiatives are likewise public policies that must be
considered in regional transmission planning to ensure that transmission is not over-built. See
Shelley Welton, Michael B. Gerrard, FERC Order 1000 As a New Tool for Promoting Energy
Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 11025, 11027 (2012).
321
See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1801, 1827 (2012).
322
See Piedmont Envtl. Councilv. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that
FERC does not have backstop jurisdiction when a state commission withholds approval of a
permit application for over one year).
323
See id. See also generally Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and
Protectionism in Power, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 87 (2012).

63

DRAFT—May 6, 2013
gridlock surrounding interstate transmission infrastructure, posing a practically
easier solution than traditional lines.324
At the very least, where storage is not a replacement for transmission lines
(as in the case of distant renewable resources), it is a complementary option for
planning and upgrading the transmission system. Whether the Commission treats
storage as a transmission or non-transmission resource is ultimately irrelevant:
transmission and non-transmission solutions must be considered comparably. So
regardless of which bucket storage falls into, FERC should ensure that storage is
considered comparably alongside traditional lines in planning the transmission
infrastructure of tomorrow.
CONCLUSION
Over the next twenty years, generation, transmission, and distribution
systems in the United States will require between $1.5 and $2 trillion dollars of
investment.325 FERC’s policies relating to interstate transmission and wholesale
power sales will significantly affect the decision making processes of market
actors, regulated utilities, state regulators, consumers, and other stakeholders who,
collectively, will bear the costs and reap the benefits of these investments.
FERC’s antiquted rules and categories threaten to stymie investment in storage
technologies that will be critical on the smart, resilient, reliable, clean, and
efficient grid of tomorrow. Unless and until FERC acts, resources will continue
to be invested in legacy technologies that may fit more comfortably into existing
regulations, but provide less value at higher costs in the real world and ultimately
result in higher prices for consumers.
The time for FERC to act is now. The federal government is pouring billions
of dollars into storage research, development, and demonstration, while state
policies promoting storage and/or renewables have intensified the demand for
flexible, grid-deployed storage resources. In the Commission’s own words, some
storage technologies are already cost-effective, particularly where permitted to
access multiple revenue streams by providing multiple grid services. And while
other technologies are still developing, deferring action by arguing that storage
resources are not yet mature is a red herring—the only way to know whether
storage is effective is in a market with just and reasonable rules. In the near-term,
storage will compete with resources fueled by cheap natural gas.326 But storage
technology will improve and system needs for flexibility will intensify, while
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natural gas prices will likely gradually increase from current historic lows.
Regardless, FERC’s duty is not to divine who should win or lose; the Commission
must simply ensure that the game is fair.
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